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I. INTRODUCTION
Economic analysis tends to focus on the decisions of individuals. This emphasis likely stems from the underlying model of
rational choice, which posits an autonomous individual who makes
rational choices that maximize his satisfactions.' Yet much economic activity takes place within institutions for which groups often make decisions. Within the public corporation, for example, we
see group decisionmaking at many levels of the corporate hierarchy.
Indeed, with the emergence of quality circles and self-directed work
teams as characteristic features of modern industrial organization,
it is more accurate to describe large industrial corporations as a
2
hierarchy of teams rather than one of individuals.
At the apex of the corporate hierarchy stands yet another
team-the board of directors. Curiously, corporate law scholarship
rarely focuses on the board as a team production problem.' The default model of corporate governance envisioned by modern statutes
demonstrably contemplates not a single hierarch, but rather a multimember body that typically will act by consensus. 4 Why?
Cognitive psychology has a long-standing tradition of studying individual versus group decisionmaking. 5 With the emergence of
behavioral economics as a legitimate field of inquiry, moreover, experimental economists have begun looking at similar questions.
Taken together with various strands of new institutional economics,

1.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 353 (1990) (describing the
rational choice model).

2.
See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
3.
Exceptions include Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) and Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of
CorporateBoards: Law, Norms and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797 (2001).
4.
See infra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
5.
See infra Part III (discussing studies).
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these approaches shed considerable light on the role of the board of
directors.
This Article begins by briefly describing the role of the board
both in law and in practice. 6 Part II explores the distinction between consensus and authority as modes of institutional decisionmaking. As hierarchical institutions, corporations rely far more
heavily on authority than on consensus. Yet, at the apex of the hierarchy is a collegial body that functions mainly by consensus.
Part III is the core of the Article. In order to evaluate corporate law's preference for collective decisionmaking, we need to know
whether group decisionmaking is superior to that of individuals. A
wealth of experimental data suggests that groups often make better
decisions than individuals. Even more strikingly, the conditions
under which groups outperform individuals in laboratory settings
have important similarities to board decisionmaking.
It is surprising that corporate law scholarship has largely
ignored the basic question from which this Article takes its title:
Why a board? Part III argues that the board's existence follows logically from the evidence on group decisionmaking. Curiously,
corporate law scholarship has almost uniformly ignored this important body of research. 7 Part IV asks whether the legal regimes governing boards are well-designed to encourage optimal board behavior. Two legal subregimes are examined. First is the seemingly formalistic statutory rules governing board of directors processes in
light of the evidence on group decisionmaking. Those rules were the
original impetus for this Article. Are they mere historical anachronisms-creatures of a long-dead era of formalism-or do they have
an efficiency rationale? Part IV contends that most, if not all, statutory rules on board formalities turn out to be consistent with the
learning on how groups can best make decisions. Second is the legal
standard governing review of judicial decisions. As we shall see, the
adverse consequences of judicial review for effective team function-

6.
My analysis focuses on large public industrial corporations. For a like-minded discussion of other organizational forms, see Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J. Milliken, Cognition and
CorporateGovernance: UnderstandingBoards of Directors as Strategic Decision-MakingGroups,
24 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 489, 500-01 (1999) (discussing nonprofits, small firms, and high-tech
firms).
7.
An exception is ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW (1986), who acknowledged the potential utility of "empirical work of sociologists who have studied groups and organizations." Id.
at 110. Other exceptions include Robert J. Haft, Business Decisions by the New Board: Behavioral Science and CorporateLaw, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1, 50-67 (1981), and Note, The Proprietyof
Judicial Deference to Corporate Boards of Directors, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1894, 1896-97 (1983).
Langevoort's work on boards of directors overlaps somewhat with the analysis herein, but relies
mainly on a different branch of behavioral science. See Langevoort, supra note 3, at 797-801.
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ing turn out to be a partial explanation for the business judgment
rule.
II. THE BOARD'S STATUTORY ROLE
A defining characteristic of public corporations is the socalled separation of ownership and control.8 Shareholders, who are
said to "own" the firm, 9 have virtually no power to control either its
day-to-day operation or its long-term policies. Instead, the key
players in the formal decisionmaking structure are the members of
the board of directors. As the Delaware Code puts it, the corporation's business and affairs "shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors." 1° Accordingly, shareholders have essentially no power to initiate corporate action and, moreover, are entitled to approve or disapprove only a very few board actions." The
statutory decisionmaking model thus is one in which the board acts
and shareholders, at most, react.
This separation of ownership and control has a strong efficiency justification. Kenneth Arrow has described two basic decisionmaking structures: "consensus" and "authority."' 2 Consensus is
utilized where each member of the organization has identical information and interests and will therefore select the course of action preferred by all of the other team members. In contrast, authority-based decisionmaking structures arise where team members
have different interests and amounts of information. They are
characterized by the existence of a central agency to which all relevant information is transmitted and which is empowered to make
decisions binding on the whole. Given the collective action problems

8.

ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE

PROPERTY 84-90 (1932).
9.
In the dominant nexus of contracts theory of the firm, ownership is not a meaningful
concept because shareholders are simply one of the inputs bound together by this web of voluntary agreements. See generally G. Mitu Gulati et al., Connected Contracts,47 UCLA L. REV. 887
(2000) (discussing nexus of contracts theory); Thomas S. Ulen, The Coasean Firm in Law and
Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, 318-28 (1993) (same).
10. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2000).
11. Under the Delaware Code, for example, shareholder voting rights are essentially limited
to the election of directors and approval of charter or bylaw amendments, mergers, sales of substantially all of the corporation's assets, and voluntary dissolution. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§
109, 211 (2000). As a formal matter, only the election of directors and amending the by-laws do
not require board approval before shareholder action is possible. See id. In practice, of course,
even the election of directors (absent a proxy contest) is predetermined by the existing board
nominating the next year's board. To be sure, the shareholders' right to elect the board of directors can give the former de facto control even though the statute assigns de jure control to the
latter.
12.

KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 68-70 (1974).
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inherent in any large organization, it is difficult to imagine a corporation of any substantial size making effective use of consensus as a
mode for organizational decisionmaking. 13 In order to effectuate an
authority-based decisionmaking structure, however, ownership and
control must be separated.
Although separation of ownership and control is a necessary
precondition for efficient corporate decisionmaking, it is not a sufficient one. The modern public corporation is too big for the board to
manage on anything resembling a day-to-day basis. Moreover,
many directors of large corporations are outsiders who have fulltime jobs elsewhere and therefore can devote relatively little time
to the running of the business for which they act as directors. Section 8.01(b) of the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) reflects
these basic truisms in two respects. First, section 8.01(b) provides
that the "business and affairs of the corporation" shall be "managed
under the direction of" the board. This formulation is intended to
make clear that the board's role is to formulate broad policy and
oversee the subordinates who actually conduct the business day-today.' 4 Second, the statute also provides that corporate powers may
be exercised "under the [board's] authority," which allows the board
to delegate decisionmaking authority to corporate officers.' 5 In turn,
corporate officers may delegate some of their responsibilities to less
senior employees, and so forth down the organizational chart. Consequently, public corporations traditionally have been characterized
not by participatory democracy, but rather by hierarchies in which
decisions are made on a more-or-less authoritarian basis.
Despite downsizing and the widespread adoption of employee
involvement programs (such as quality circles), 16 public corporations remain hierarchical institutions. To be sure, with the growth
of team production, many firms are more accurately described as
hierarchies of teams rather than of individuals. Yet they are hierarchies just the same.
Hierarchy persists because it remains a high survival value
adaptive response to the transaction costs associated with organizing production within a firm. In particular, hierarchy is a very effi-

13. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, ParticipatoryManagement Within a Theory of the Firm, 21
J. CORP. L. 657, 664-67 (1996) (arguing that effective corporate decisionmaking requires authority-based governance institutions).
14. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.01 cmt. (1998).
15. Id.
16. On these phenomena and their relationship to the economics of hierarchy, see Stephen
M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered ParticipatoryManagement: An OrganizationalFailuresAnalysis, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979 (1998).
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cient mechanism for information development and transmittal.
Both new institutional economics and behavioral economics posit
that decisionmakers are rational actors but that their cognitive
powers are limited.17 Among other things, bounded rationality implies that decisionmakers can only gather so much information
from so many inputs before being overloaded. In the corporate context, bounded rationality thus specifically implies that an individual manager can gather information about the productivity and capacities of only a limited number of inputs and, consequently, that
no supervisor should receive such information from more than a few
subordinates.
Branching hierarchies are an efficient adaptation to bounded
rationality. 18 They limit the span of control over which any individual manager has supervision to a small number of subordinates.
Specifically, branching hierarchies put people into small groups,
each member of which reports information to the same supervisor.
That supervisor is likewise a member of a small group that reports
to a superior and so on up to the top. 19 Such an organizational system gets reliable information to the right decisionmaker more efficiently than any other organizational system. Not surprisingly,
some form of branching hierarchy therefore tends to be found in
most public corporations; they could not make decisions without it.
In addition to its information production and transmission
functions, hierarchy also provides an important constraint on
agency costs within the firm. Although agents ex post have strong
incentives to shirk, 20 ex ante they have equally strong incentives to
agree to a corporate contract containing terms designed to prevent

17. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 45-46
(1985) (quoting Herbert Simon to the effect that economic actors are "intendedly rational, but
only limitedly so"); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Remov-

ing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1075-76 (2000)
(locating bounded rationality within a behavioral science framework); see generally infra Part III
(discussing the phenomenon of bounded rationality).
18. See generally CLARK, supra note 7, at 801-16 (offering a detailed defense of corporate hierarchies).
19. No implication is intended that information is always funneled to the top of the hierarchy or that all decisions are made there. To the contrary, all corporate hierarchies are characterized by a degree of decentralization of decisionmaking, with numerous decisionmakers at various
levels within the hierarchy being tasked with particular areas of responsibility. Indeed, firms
most appropriately might be described as a set of many overlapping hierarchies. Roy Radner,
Hierarchy:The Economics of Managing,30 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1382, 1412 (1992). The point is
only that branching hierarchies are an efficient means of ensuring that information flows to the
correct supervisor.
20. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
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shirking. In any organization, however, the familiar triad of contracting problems-uncertainty, complexity, and opportunismprecludes the organization and its agents from entering into the
complete contract necessary to prevent shirking by the latter. 2 1 In
large organizations, these transaction cost barriers to contracting
are compounded by the equally familiar litany of collective action
problems. Accordingly, organizations rely not on ex ante contracting
but on ex post governance-creating mechanisms for detecting and
punishing shirking. Specifically, managers of such organizations
are tasked with monitoring the organization's members: management meters the marginal productivity of each member and re22
sponds as necessary to prevent shirking.
Hierarchy's contribution to the monitoring function is especially evident in the most important form of business organization:
the M-form corporation. Such firms have two defining characteristics: many distinct operating units and management by a hierarchy
of salaried executives. 23 The board of directors delegates responsibility to top management and monitors its performance. The top
managers in the firm's central office delegate responsibility to
managers of operating units. In turn, the managers of each operating unit are responsible for monitoring the productivity of their
unit. The process continues down to the foreman on the shop floor.
Creating such a branching hierarchy addresses the problems of uncertainty, bounded rationality, and shirking faced by monitors by
breaking the firm team into discrete segments, each of which is
more readily monitored than the whole. At each hierarchical level,
the responsible monitor is responsible for supervising only a few
individuals, which usefully limits and focuses his task.
Despite the clear advantages to the public corporation of authority-based decisionmaking and hierarchical governance, at the
apex of that hierarchy is not a single autocrat, but rather a multimember body that usually functions by consensus. To be sure, it is
often said that, in the real world, boards are captured by senior
management. According to this view, "managers dominate their
boards by using their de facto power to select and compensate direc-

21.

See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 37 (1996)

(opining that the lesson of bounded rationality is that "all complex contracts are unavoidably
incomplete" (emphasis omitted)).
22. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production,Information Costs, and Economic Organization,62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 782 (1972).
23.

ALFRED D.

CHANDLER, JR.,

AMERICAN BUSINESS 1 (1977).

THE VISIBLE HAND:
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tors and by exploiting personal ties with them." 24 Even with that
caveat, however, it seems useful to think of the board as a produc25
tion team.
What then does the board produce and how does it produce
it?26 First and foremost, the board monitors and disciplines
top
management. 27 Second, while boards rarely are involved in day-today operational decisionmaking, most boards have at least some
managerial functions. Broad policymaking is commonly a board
prerogative, for example. Even more commonly, however, individual
board members provide advice and guidance to top managers with
respect to operational and/or policy decisions. Finally, the board
provides access to a network of contacts that may be useful in gathering resources and/or obtaining business. Outside directors affiliated with financial institutions, for example, apparently facilitate
the firm's access to capital. 28
The extent to which boards actually monitor management
and effectively discipline subpar performance has been the subject
of considerable dispute. As noted, conventional wisdom asserts that
boards are captured by senior management. The board capture
24.

Barry Baysinger & Robert E. Hoskisson, The Composition of Boards of Directors and

Strategic Control: Effects on Corporate Strategy, 15 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 72, 72-73 (1990).
25. Production teams (a/k/a work groups) are defined conventionally as "a collection of individuals who are interdependent in their tasks, who share responsibility for outcomes, [and] who
see themselves and who are seen by others as an intact social entity embedded in one or more
larger social systems .. " Susan G. Cohen & Diane E. Bailey, What Makes Teams Work: Group
Effectiveness Research from the Shop Floor to the Executive Suite, 23 J. MGMT. 239, 241 (1997);
see also Kenneth L. Bettenhausen, Five Years of Groups Research: What We Have Learned and
What Needs to Be Addressed, 17 J. MGMT. 345, 346 (1991) (defining teams as "intact social systems that perform one or more tasks within an organizational setting").
Williamson's industrial organization matrix identifies two forms such teams may take: primitive and relational. In both, team members perform nonseparable tasks. WILLIAMSON, supra note
17, at 246-47. They are distinguished by the degree of firm-specific human capital possessed by
such members. Id. In primitive teams, workers have little such capital; in relational teams, they
have substantial amounts. Id. Most boards probably qualify as relational teams.
26. The following analysis tracks the taxonomy suggested by Johnson who map "directors'
responsibilities into three broadly defined roles ... labeled control, service, and resource dependence." Jonathan L. Johnson et al., Boards of Directors:A Review and Research Agenda, 22 J.
MGMT. 409, 411 (1996). A similar taxonomy was adopted by Langevoort, supra note 3, at 801-05.
Other taxonomies could be devised, of course. For example, Dallas adopts a two component taxonomy distinguishing between the board's monitoring and "relational" roles. Lynne L. Dallas,
Proposalsfor Reform of CorporateBoards of Directors:The Dual Board and Board Ombudsperson, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 91, 98-104 (1997).
27. See Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director'sDuty of Attention:
Time for Reality, 39 BUS. LAW. 1477, 1494 (1984) (arguing that the board's role "does not consist
of taking affirmative action on individual matters; it is instead a continuing flow of supervisory
process, punctuated only occasionally by a discrete transactional decision").
28. Johnson et al., supra note 26, at 427-28 (summarizing studies supporting the hypothesis
that board membership is used to facilitate access to capital).
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phenomenon, however, seems less valid today than it once was.
Modern CEOs are constrained both from below, by other members
29
of the top management team, and from above, by the board.
During the 1980s and 1990s, several trends coalesced to encourage more active and effective board oversight. Much director
compensation is now paid in stock, for example, which helps align
director and shareholder interests. 30 Courts have made clear that
effective board processes and oversight are essential if board decisions are to receive the deference traditionally accorded to them
under the business judgment rule, especially insofar as structural
decisions are concerned (such as those relating to management buyouts). 31 Third, director conduct is constrained by an active market
for corporate control, ever-rising rates of shareholder litigation,
and, some say, activist shareholders. 32 As a result, modern boards
of directors typically are smaller than their antecedents, meet more
often, are more independent from management, own more stock,
and have better access to information. These developments culminated in a series of high-profile board revolts against incumbent
managers at such iconic American corporations as General Motors,
Westinghouse, and American Express. 33 More recently, the firing of
"Chainsaw Al" Dunlap by Sunbeam's board provides yet more anec34
dotal evidence of board activism.
As boards become stronger and more independent of top
management, moreover, the process builds momentum. For example, Westphal and Zajac have demonstrated that as board power
increases relative to the CEO-measured by such factors as the

29. For a review of research on top management teams, see Cohen & Bailey, supra note 25,
at 265-76.
30. Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured Board: The
History ofa Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127, 134-35 (1996).
31. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent Directorsand the ALI Corporate Governance
Project, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1034, 1068-81 (1993) (describing how judicial review of management buyouts and other conflict of interest transactions focus on role of independent directors).
32. See Forbes & Milliken, supra note 6, at 489. For a review of the literature on the corporate governance role of institutional investors generally and board reform specifically, see Johnson et al., supra note 26, at 414-16. For skepticism as to the merits and likely sustainability of
institutional investor activism, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Constraintson ShareholderActivism
in the United States and Slovenia, at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
228780 (May 17, 2000); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 671, 693-733 (1995).
33. See Ira M. Millstein, The Evolution of the Certifying Board, 48 BUS. LAW. 1485, 1488-90
(1993).
34. In most cases, of course, board oversight tends to be both less dramatic and more informal. Individual directors pass concerns onto the CEO, who in turn bounces ideas off board members. Rather than struggling to overcome the collective action problems that impede firing a
CEO, an individual director tries to obtain better performance through a private reprimand.
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percentage of insiders and whether the CEO also served as chairman-newly appointed directors become more demographically
similar to the board.3 5 In any event, the institutional structure created by corporate law allows, but does not contemplate, one-man
rule. If it comes to overt conflict between the board and top management, the board's authority prevails as a matter of law, if not
always in practice. Indeed, it is the necessity for retaining dismissal
of senior management as a potential sanction that explains why the
board is at the apex of the corporate hierarchy rather than functioning as an advisory committee off to the side of the corporate or36
ganizational chart.
Whatever side one takes in this debate as an empirical matter, conceptualizing the board as a production team has important
theoretical implications. The effort of an individual can be measured. How hard does he or she work? An individual's output is also
observable, at least by proxy. How well has the firm performed under his or her stewardship? In contrast, monitoring the work of a
production team is more difficult. In team production, inputs (e.g.,
effort) are difficult to measure and, because team tasks typically
are nonseparable, individual output is not readily observable. The
monitoring mechanisms applicable to a single individual thus are
largely irrelevant as applied to a team. Instead, agency costs are
constrained in the team setting mainly by internal team governance
37
structures.
In light of these monitoring problems, corporate law's preference for a collegial decisionmaking body rather than an individual
autocrat seems puzzling. Yet, it gets worse. First, members of a
production team often develop idiosyncratic working relationships
with one another. In a sense, team members develop not only firmspecific human capital, but also team-specific human capital. Sanctions such as dismissal that disrupt these intrateam relationships
thus may result in a substantial loss of efficiency.

35.. James D. Westphal & Edward J. Zajac, Who Shall Govern? CEO/BoardPower, Demographic Similarity, and New DirectorSelection, 40 ADMIN. ScI. Q. 60, 78 (1995) (cautioning that
CEO control over director selection remains the general rule).
36. One can imagine a structure of corporate authority identical to current norms except
that the board acts as a mere advisory body to a single autocratic CEO. On the face of it, such a
structure seemingly would preserve most of the informational and relational advantages of the
current structure. Consequently, it is the board's power to hire and fire senior management that
explains its position at the apex of the corporate hierarchy.
37. See infra Part IV.
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Second, the phenomenon known as social loafing 38 strongly
suggests a preference for individual rather than multiple decisionmakers. In a famous 1913 study which measured how hard subjects
pulled a rope, members of two-person teams pulled to only ninetythree percent of their individual capacity, members of trios pulled
to only eighty-five percent, and members of groups of eight pulled to
only forty-nine percent. 39 This phenomenon is partially attributable
to the difficulty of coordinating group effort as size increases. (Too
many cooks spoil the soup.) Social loafing is also attributable, however, to the difficulty of motivating members of a group where identification and/or measurement of individual productivity are difficult 4 0-i.e., where the group functions as a production team. While
board decisionmaking differs rather dramatically from tug-of-war,
members of a multimember board likely engage in a certain amount
of social loafing. To be sure, unlike a team in a tug-of-war game,
board members probably do not get into each other's way. Accordingly, it is unlikely that there will be physical coordination problems. Yet because social loafing is also attributable to the difficulty
of motivating members of a team with nonseparable outputs and
nonobservable inputs, 41 it nevertheless can be expected with respect
to the workings of a relational team like the board.
If board-based governance is a useful construct, there must
be countervailing considerations that make group decisionmakers
preferable to individuals. Further, it must be demonstrated that
groups are likely to be more effective decisionmakers in settings
analogous to those in which boards operate. If so, the economics
(and/or psychology) of group decisionmaking may shed light on a
variety of legal issues relating to the board's function as a production team.

38. See Bibb Latan6 et al., Many Hands Make Light the Work: The Causes and Consequences of Social Loafing, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 822, 828-32 (1979).
39. David A. Kravitz & Barbara Martin, Ringelmann Rediscovered: The OriginalArticle, 50
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 936, 938 (1986).
40. Bettenhausen, supra note 25, at 360-61.
41. Group settings that involve task nonseparability both prevent supervisors from evaluating individual performance and limit the ability of workers to obtain individual feedback,
thereby diminishing the reinforcing effects of praise and criticism. See Kate Szymanski &
Stephen G. Harkins, Social Loafing and Self-Evaluation with a Social Standard, 53 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 891, 891 (1987) (stating that "individual outputs were 'lost in the
crowd,' and participants could receive neither credit nor blame for their performances").
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III. WHY A BOARD? GROUP VERSUS INDIVIDUAL
DECISIONMAKING

Acting alone, an individual director "has no power of his own
to act on the corporation's behalf, but only as one of the body of directors acting as a board." 42 Moreover, as the MBCA puts it, "directors may act only at a meeting unless otherwise expressly authorized by statute." 43 Why this emphasis on collective rather than individual action?
The MBCA's drafters offer the following answer: "The underlying theory is that the consultation and exchange of views is an
integral part of the functioning of the board. "'44 Or, as Forbes and
Milliken opine, "The very existence of the board as an institution is
rooted in the wise belief that the effective oversight of an organization exceeds the capabilities of any individual and that collective
knowledge and deliberation are better suited to this task." 45 These
arguments run afoul of the old joke that a camel is a horse designed
by a committee, but they find considerable support in the literature
on individual versus group decisionmaking.
A. Groups Versus Individuals: Experimental Evidence
Experimental psychologists and economists have found that
group decisionmaking, under certain circumstances, can be superior
to decisionmaking by individuals. Indeed, numerous studies have
found that group decisions are not only superior to those of the average member, but also to those made by the very best individual
decisionmakers within the group. Because this literature has received little attention in legal scholarship, the following discussion
recounts in some detail the findings of leading experiments conducted by several generations of researchers.
In the 1930s, Shaw conducted a classic experiment in which
four-person teams of undergraduates solved various problems with
single, self-confirming solutions (so-called "Eureka" problems). One
set of problems involved three variants on the classic missionaries
and cannibals game. 46 The other set of problems required subjects

42.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14C cmt. b (1958).

43. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.20 cmt. (1984 & Supp.).
44. Id.
45. Forbes & Milliken, supra note 6, at 490.
46. In this game, subjects were given three disks representing missionaries and three disks
representing cannibals. The missionaries and cannibals are on one side of a river. The decisionmaker must get all six to the other side of the river using a boat that can only carry two disks at
a time. All missionaries and one cannibal can row. Cannibals must never outnumber missionar-
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to solve two word puzzles and another involving spatial relationships. The proportion of correct solutions was significantly higher
in a sample of groups than in a sample of individuals working
47
alone.
A much more recent study, with a radically different design,
yielded comparable findings. In an article critical of their fellow
economists for paying too little attention to group decisionmaking,
Blinder and Morgan report a pair of laboratory experiments demonstrating that group decisionmaking is superior to that of individuals. 48 The first experiment involved a purely statistical problem requiring even less exercise of critical judgment than Shaw's Eureka
problems. In this experiment-intended to replicate situations in
which decisionmakers must choose between acting or waiting for
new information-students were presented with computergenerated urns containing an equal number of blue and red balls.
They were told that at some point in the experiment the composition would shift either to seventy percent red and thirty percent
blue or vice versa. Students were allowed to draw up to forty balls
from the urn, having been told that the change would occur after
one of the first ten draws. Students earned points for correctly
guessing the direction in which the composition had changed. In
order to measure the speed of decisionmaking as well as its accu-

ies in any location for obvious reasons, albeit politically incorrect ones. See Marjorie E. Shaw, A
Comparison of Individuals and Small Groups in the Rational Solution of Complex Problems, 44
AM. J. PSYCHOL. 491, 492-93 (1932) (describing problems).
47. Id. at 496-504 (summarizing results). Some subsequent researchers claimed Shaw's
data did not conclusively establish group superiority. In reviewing Shaw's data, they claimed
that Shaw's groups rarely exceeded, and often fell short of, a theoretical baseline for predicting
group performance. See Frederick C. Miner, Jr., Group Versus Individual Decision Making.-An
Investigation of Performance Measures, Decision Strategies, and Process Losses/Gains, 33
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 112, 114 (1984) (summarizing argument). Consequently, they claimed, rather than being a more efficient way of making decisions, group decisionmaking suffered from a phenomenon referred to as "process loss." Id.
In order for board-based governance to be preferred to that of a single autocrat, of course,
group performance need only be superior to that of individuals, it need not be optimal relative to
some theoretical model. The baselines used by Shaw's critics, moreover, are problematic with
respect to choosing between individual and group decisionmaking outside the laboratory. Two
commonly used baselines are the performance of the best individual member of the group and
statistical pooling of individual performances. Both require individual pretests unlikely to occur
in the real world. Consequently, "such indicators should not be used to prescribe one process over
another since they are posterior indicators of performance" that are not discernable by decisionmakers. Miner, supra, at 114. Perhaps a more substantial criticism, because many studies finding groups to be superior also used individual pretests, is that many studies dispute these findings, concluding that interacting groups outperform both baselines. See infra notes 89-114.
48. ALAN S. BLINDER & JOHN MORGAN, ARE Two HEADS BETTER THAN ONE?: AN
EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF GROUP VS. INDIVIDUAL DECISIONMAKING (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 7909, 2000), at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7909.
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racy, students were penalized for each draw made after the urn had
changed composition. 49 The subjects were given an incentive by
linking their compensation to their score. Groups of five undergraduate students were pretested by playing the game individually.
Then each set of five played the game as a group permitted to communicate freely. Three further rounds followed: individual play,
group play using the opposite decision rule from that used in the
first group round, and a final round of individual play. 50
In this experiment, Blinder and Morgan tested two hypotheses of interest for our purposes. 51 First, they sought to determine
whether groups would make decisions more slowly than individuals. Using the number of draws following the actual change in composition as the measurement of decision lag, they found that groups
actually made decisions faster than individuals. The difference,
however, was not statistically significant. 52 Of course, the absence
of a statistically significant difference between the speed of individual and group decisionmaking is itself highly relevant, because it
tends to disprove the common intuition that it takes groups longer
to make decisions.
Second, Blinder and Morgan asked whether groups made
better decisions. On average, group scores were 3.7% higher than
53
individual scores, which was a statistically significant difference.
Because scores reflected both speed and accuracy, Blinder and Morgan also looked at whether the groups or individuals were more
likely to have correctly guessed the direction in which the urn's
composition shifted. Groups got it right 89.3% of the time, while
individuals did so only 84.3% of the time. This difference also was
54
statistically significant.
Blinder and Morgan acknowledge the artificiality of this setting but contend that it allowed them "to isolate the pure effect of
individual versus group decision-making."' 55 The extent to which one
can rely on laboratory experiments is a pervasive problem in ex-

49. Id. at 6-8.
50. Id. at 9-11. A learning effect was noted in early rounds. Id. at 18. As to whether the ordering of the experimental design affected the outcome, see id. at 20-21.
51. In addition, they tested whether unanimity or majority rule was superior. Id. at 16.
There was no statistically significant difference as to either score or accuracy between unanimous and majority rule. Id.
52. Id. at 13. The use of draws rather than elapsed clock time as a measurement of lag, of
course, complicates efforts to generalize Blinder and Morgan's findings to the board setting,
where time is often of the essence.
53. Id. at 15.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 6.
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perimental economics and psychology. 56 Indeed, some critics call
into question the validity of the entire enterprise. Judge Posner, for
example, relied on this tactic in critiquing the somewhat similar
experiments used to demonstrate the endowment effect:
Most individuals, including virtually all university students-the principal experimental subjects of behavioral economics, which relies much more heavily than
standard economics does on experiments-are buyers but not sellers. When we do
have something to sell, we usually sell through middlemen, such as real estate
brokers, rather than directly to the ultimate consumer. Experimental situations in
so we canwhich the subjects are asked to trade with each other are artificial, and
57
not have much confidence that the results generalize to real markets.

Fair enough-the behavior of undergraduates swapping coffee mugs
probably does not tell us very much about the behavior of institutional investors buying IPO stocks in the primary capital market.
Yet such criticisms are neither original to Posner nor even new.
Both cognitive psychologists and experimental economists long
have acknowledged "the artificial nature of the groups, tasks, or
settings in which the research has been conducted.15 8 Some of the
studies recounted herein address aspects of the problem by using
MBA students or managerial personnel instead of undergraduates.5 9 In addition, some of the evidence recounted in this Article is
taken from studies of real-world groups, such as work teams within
business firms. In any case, where empirical data is hard to obtain,
experimental data are surely better than nothing. Given the universality of boards of directors in public corporations, the wide variety of board roles and functions, and the difficulty of collecting
useful empirical data on boards, the present context seems to be
60
just such an area.
Returning to the data, Blinder and Morgan's second experiment required somewhat greater expertise and arguably somewhat
greater exercise of critical judgment. Students with at least one un-

56. See Jennifer Arlen, Comment: The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1769 (1998) ("[W]e cannot be confident an observed bias really does affect
actual decisions-as opposed to being simply an artifact of experimental design-until we can
explain why the bias exists.").
57. Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1551, 1566 (1998).

58. Larry K. Michaelsen et al., A Realistic Test of Individual Versus Group Consensus Decision Making, 74 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 834, 834 (1989).

59. Consistent with Posner's critique, one study using managerial personnel as its subjects
found that group performance was inferior to that of individuals. See John P. Campbell, Individual Versus Group Problem Solving in an Industrial Sample, 52 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 205, 209
(1968).
60. Cf. Forbes & Milliken, supra note 6, at 492 ("Because of the strictly confidential and
highly interpretive nature of board activity, it is likely to be extremely difficult for researchers to
measure the task performance of boards in ways that are both reliable and comprehensive.").
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dergraduate course in macroeconomics were presented with a computer-generated model requiring them to make economic policy decisions. Specifically, students were required to set interest rates so
as to meet both inflation and unemployment targets. 61 As with the
urn experiment, individual and group play rounds alternated.
Again, there was no statistically significant difference in the
speed with which groups and individuals made decisions. 62 Again,
group scores were higher than individual scores. 63 Notably, when
subjects acted alone, the "ersatz monetary policymakers moved in64
terest rates in the wrong direction" more often than did groups.
One significant finding is that the average performance of
the five individuals making up the group had almost no explanatory
power with respect to how well the group performed. 65 Even more
striking, the performance of the best member of the group did not
predict group performance. 66 As we shall see in the next section,
these findings take on considerable importance in evaluating the
merits of decisionmaking by interacting groups.
In sum, Blinder and Morgan conclude "two heads-or, in this
case, five-are indeed better than one. Society is, in that case, wise
to assign many important decisions to committees." 67 Still, Blinder
and Morgan's research cannot conclusively establish that society is
wise to assign corporate decisionmaking to boards rather than individuals. Their experiments relied on dichotomous decision tasks,
merely requiring subjects to make probabilistic estimates using
68
simplistic decisionmaking processes.

61. BLINDER & MORGAN, supra note 48, at 23-28.
62. Id. at 30-31.
63. Id. at 32.
64. Id. at 33.
65. Id. at 41.
66. Id. at 46.
67. Id. at 47.
68. One early literature review identified several categories of decision tasks experimenters
had studied, with the following results: (1) learning and concept-attainment tasks, at which
groups are consistently superior to individuals, Gayle W. Hill, Group Versus Individual Performance: Are N + I Heads Better than One?, 91 PSYCHOL. BULL. 517, 520-22 (1982); (2) concept mastery and creativity tasks, at which groups tended to outperform individuals, although some studies found that groups did not outperform their best members, id. at 522-23; (3) abstract problem
solving, such as Shaw's experiment, in which the extent to which groups outperform even their
best member increases with the complexity of the problem, id. at 524-25; (4) brainstorming over
abstract problems, with no single correct answer, at which statistically created groups outperform actual groups, id. at 525-27; (5) complex problems, such as the winter survival exercise, at
which groups outperform individuals but did not exceed baseline measurements of potential
created by statistical pooling, id. at 527-29.
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Studies of the sort conducted by Shaw or Blinder and Morgan thus are of somewhat limited utility with respect to corporate
governance. Most board decisionmaking does not involve problems
with a single correct solution, let alone a self-confirming one. Instead, relevant experiments are those requiring the creative exercise of evaluative judgment with respect to complex problems having a range of solutions. Unfortunately, many experiments in this
69
area focus on descriptive rather than evaluative judgments.
In contrast, Miner devised an experiment explicitly intended
to test the ability of groups to exercise evaluative judgment vis-6vis that of individuals. Miner's experiment required sixty-nine selfselected groups, each composed of four undergraduate business students, to solve the so-called winter survival exercise. This exercise,
which is variously attributed, has become something of a benchmark standard in the field. The subject group is told that they are
survivors of an airplane crash at a remote location. They first must
decide whether to walk out or remain at the crash site. They then
must rank the utility of fifteen survival aids. In Miner's case, a
group of four military winter survival experts was used to validate
70
the exercise's purported correct solution.
Although Miner's experiment does not directly implicate corporate governance, it has certain instructive features. First, it used
business students, who presumably resemble corporate directors
more closely than other plausible experimental subjects. Second,
the subjects knew one another before becoming members of the
group and were allowed to form their own groups, both of which
somewhat replicate the process by which boards form. Finally, and
most importantly, the subjects shared a single goal (i.e., survival).
Granted, the experiment thus did not require them to aggregate
preferences as to which there might be value differences, but rather
to pool their collective knowledge and use that knowledge to evaluate alternatives in light of the shared goal. If we assume that directors generally share a primary goal of shareholder wealth maximization, however, this experimental condition also replicates corpo71
rate governance.

69. Miner, supra note 47, at 114-15.
70. See id. at 116-17 (describing experiment).
71. Admittedly, the assumption that directors pursue shareholder wealth maximization is
contested. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1434-35 n.39 (1993) (contending that corporate managers' training and socialization lead them to internalize shareholder
wealth maximization as a decisionmaking norm). Obviously, Miner's results are less instructive
with respect to board decisions involving conflicted interests.
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Even the limitations of Miner's study bear some resemblance
to corporate boards, at least insofar as outsider-dominated boards
are concerned. Student subjects bring to the task only general human capital, and the experimental design cannot capture any
equivalent to firm-specific human capital. Yet, outside directors
accumulate significant firm-specific knowledge and human capital
only after very long tenure. The subjects also had relatively little
stake in the outcome, but many outside directors likewise lack a
72
direct economic stake in the firm.
Miner found that group rankings were more accurate than
those of the average individual subject.7 3 Group rankings, however,
tended to be less accurate than those of the best decisionmaker
within each group. 74 At first blush, Miner's results suggest a preference for individual decisionmaking, but the ability to identify the
"best" individual decisionmaker is solely an artifact of the experimental design. Individual evaluations could be scored by comparison to the correct solution and ranked by the experimenter. Yet as
discussed below, identifying a superior decisionmaker is far more
problematic in the real world.
Hiltz, Johnson, and Turoff ("the Hiltz group") also conducted
an experiment using the winter survival scenario, although apparently not in an effort to replicate Miner's study (which they do not
even cite). 75 Their results even more clearly favor the superiority of
group decisionmaking. Of the sixteen groups studied, eleven produced better decisions as a group than any of their individual members were able to make in a pretest, one equaled the performance of
its best member, and the remainder did worse than their best individual. Comparable results were obtained by other researchers who
76
replicated their experimental design.

72. See Haft, supra note 7, at 11. This is less true than it was when Haft wrote, due mainly
to the increased use of stock-based compensation. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. In
addition, Haft overlooked the reputational and other nonpecuniary stakes the director has in
firm performance. See Bainbridge, supra note 31, at 1059-60 (discussing incentive structure
faced by independent directors). On balance, however, the point probably remains a fair one.
73. Miner, supra note 47, at 118. Miner's results were replicated by Roger J. Volkema &
Ronald H. Gorman, The Influence of Cognitive-Based Group Composition on Decision-Making
Process and Outcome, 35 J. MGMT. STUD. 105, 114 (1998).
74. Miner, supra note 47, at 118; see also Ernest J. Hall et al., Group Problem Solving Effectiveness Under Conditions ofPooling vs. Interaction,59 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 147, 152 (1963) (finding

that the best individual performance was equal to or exceeded that of the group in seventeen of
twenty-two cases).
75. See Starr Roxanne Hiltz et al., Experiments in Group DecisionMaking: Communication
Process and Outcome in Face-to-Face Versus Computerized Conferences, 13 HUM. COMM. RES.
225, 231 (1986).
76. Id. at 225.
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In sum, groups appear to outperform their average member
consistently, even at relatively complex tasks requiring exercise of
evaluative judgment. There is contested evidence as to whether
groups outperform their best member, which the next section
evaluates in more detail. Accordingly, it seems fair to conclude that
group decisionmaking often is preferable to that of individuals. In
addition to the specific studies recounted above, which are corroborated by those described in following sections, a number of comprehensive literature reviews confirm that conclusion. 77 Corporate
law's strong emphasis on collective decisionmaking by the board
thus seems to have a compelling efficiency rationale.
B. Why Are Groups Superior?
Assuming group decisionmaking is advantageous, why might
that be so? Surprisingly, the behavioral literature on group decisionmaking frequently offers quite rudimentary theories as to why
groups outperform individuals. One contribution of the present research is its use of new institutional economics to develop a theory
of group superiority that can be related to corporate law issues.
In this section, we consider three answers to that question.
These explanations are complementary, not competing, and overlap
to a considerable degree. Yet it nonetheless seems helpful to break
them out individually. Among other reasons, separate treatment
helps identify the circumstances under which group decisionmaking
is most likely to be preferable to that of individuals.
1. Bounded Rationality
Decisionmaking requires the use of scarce resources for four
purposes: (1) observation, or the gathering of information; (2) memory, or the storage of information; (3) computation, or the manipulation of information; and (4) communication, or the transmission of
information.7 8 How do groups minimize these transaction costs visa-vis individual decisionmakers? Multiple sources of information
may make it less costly to gather information, but it seems unlikely
that directors qua directors do much to facilitate the observation
process. Any such savings, moreover, likely are offset by increased
communication costs. By decentralizing both access to information

77. See supra note 68; infra note 98.
78. Roy Radner, Bounded Rationality, Indeterminacy, and the Theory of the Firm, 106
ECON. J. 1360, 1363 (1996).
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and decisionmaking power, group decisionmaking requires additional resources.
If groups have an advantage relevant to the institution of the
board of directors, it therefore seems most likely to arise with respect to either memory and/or computation. As to the former,
groups develop a sort of collective memory that consists not only of
"the sum of individual memories, but also the awareness of who
knows what."7 9 Consequently, institutional memory is superior
when the organization is structured as a set of teams rather than as
a mere aggregate of individuals. There is some laboratory evidence,
moreover, that the collective memory of groups leads to higher qulality output. Group members, for example, seem to specialize in
memorizing specific aspects of complex repetitive tasks.80
In a particularly striking demonstration of this phenomenon,
Vollrath, Sheppard, Hinsz, and Davis ("the Vollrath group") used a
mock trial scenario to test group versus individual memory. Subjects listened to a tape-recorded mock trial for assault and then
were tested to determine how well they recalled facts presented.
Group memory was superior to that of individuals as to accuracy,
volume of information retained, ability to reproduce testimony ver8
batim, and even the order in which information was presented. '
As to the relationship between group decisionmaking and
computation-based costs, the key question is whether board decisionmaking is an efficient adaptive response to the problem of
bounded rationality. Neoclassical rational choice theory assumes
that individuals act so as to maximize their expected utility, acknowledging no cognitive limits on their power to do so. 8 2 In con-

trast, both behavioral and new institutional economics posits that
the limitations of human cognition often result in decisions that fail
to maximize utility.8 3 Hence, the phenomenon of "bounded rationality,"8 4 which asserts that all humans have inherently limited

memories, computational skills, and other mental tools.
Bounded rationality becomes a particularly significant constraint on decisionmaking under conditions of complexity and uncertainty. A problem may be complex either because it involves

79. Cohen & Bailey, supra note 25, at 259.
80. Id.
81. David A. Vollrath et al., Memory Performance by Decision-Making Groups and Individuals, 43 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 289, 298 (1989).
82. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 17, at 1075-76.
83. See supra text accompanying note 17.
84. The term bounded rationality was coined by Herbert Simon. See HERBERT A. SIMON,
Rationality and Administrative Decision Making, in MODELS OF MAN 196, 196-98 (1957).
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many options, or because a limited number of initial options cascade into a decision tree with many branches. A closely related
problem is that of ambiguity, or uncertainty, which exists when decisionmakers are uncertain about the content of the alternatives
available to them or otherwise lack the information necessary to
make an optimizing choice.
Under conditions of uncertainty and complexity, bounded rational decisionmakers are unable to devise either a fully specified
solution to the problem at hand or to assess fully the probable outcomes of their action.8 5 In effect, cognitive power is a scarce resource that the inexorable laws of economics tell us decisionmakers
will (to the best of their ability) seek to allocate efficiently. Consistent with that prediction, there is evidence that actors attempt to
minimize effort in the face of complexity and ambiguity. 86 Ironically, this is a rational adaptation to bounded rationality-in response to the limits on their cognitive powers, decisionmakers seek
to reduce both the likelihood of error and the costs of decisionmaking.
An actor can economize limited cognitive resources in two
ways: first, by adopting institutional governance structures designed to promote more efficient decisionmaking, and second, by
invoking shortcuts, i.e., heuristic problem-solving decisionmaking
processes. Here we focus on the former approach, positing that
group decisionmaking appears in the corporate context when a collective governance structure provides more efficient decisionmaking
than would a single individual. Put another way, group decisionmaking may be an adaptive response to bounded rationality, creating a system for aggregating the inputs of multiple individuals with
differing knowledge, interests, and skills. In the corporate context,
the board of directors thus may have emerged as an institutional
governance mechanism to constrain the deleterious effect of
bounded rationality on the organizational decisionmaking process.
Does the process of social interaction at least help the cream
to rise to the top, so that the group seizes upon the best ideas each
member brings to the table? Or does group decisionmaking have
even more dramatic effects, such as generating synergies allowing
groups to outperform even their best members?

85. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS 23 (1975) (showing that, under conditions of uncertainty and complexity, it becomes
"very costly, perhaps impossible, to describe the complete decision tree").
86. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 17, at 1078 (citing studies).
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Shaw explained the superiority of groups in her classic experiment on grounds that multimember teams balance individual
biases and detect errors by individuals.8 7 Proposed solutions put
forward by one member of the group were three times more likely to
be rejected by another group member than by the initial proponent
of that solution. Among the proposals put forward, moreover, five
times as many incorrect solutions were rejected as were correct
ones. Accordingly, she concluded that "one point of group supremacy is the rejection of incorrect ideas that escape the notice of the
individual when working alone." 88
Shaw's analysis, of course, is more in the way of informed intuition than an explicit quantitative analysis of how social interaction affects group versus individual performance. Closer to the
mark is an interesting study by Hall, Mouton, and Blake ("the Hall
group"). At that time, in 1963, the apparent superiority of group
decisionmaking was commonly hypothesized to be an artifact of statistical pooling. 89 One could create a statistical group by pooling
(averaging) the decisions of multiple individuals. If group interaction had no synergistic effects, the decisions of real groups should
not differ significantly from those of such statistically created
groups. The Hall group devised an interesting experiment to test
this hypothesis.
The Hall group showed their subjects a portion of the classic
movie Twelve Angry Men. Recall that the holdout juror voting "not
guilty" brings the other eleven jurors over to his point of view oneby-one. Acting alone, subjects were asked to predict the order in
which the eleven in the majority would capitulate to the minority
view. Statistical groups were then created by pooling the individual
responses. Subjects were then brought together for group discussion, in which they were asked to reach a unanimous ranking.9 0
This is a nice problem for our purposes because it offers a complex
issue as to which there is a preferred answer, but not one that is
either self-confirming or even objectively correct. The actual groups
produced a more accurate score than the average of pooled individual scores, with the difference being statistically significant. 91 The

87.

Shaw, supra note 46, at 502.

88. Id. The Vollrath group likewise found evidence that, as to memory tasks, groups corrected errors by individual members. Vollrath et al., supra note 81, at 299. However, they also
found evidence of a group polarization effect. Id.

89.

See, e.g., Irving Lorge & Herbert Solomon, Two Models of Group Behavior in the Solu-

tion of Eureka-type Problems, 20 PSYCHOMETRIKA 139, 147-48 (1955).

90. See Hall et al., supra note 74, at 150-51 (describing experiment).
91. Id. at 152.
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Hall group therefore concluded that group interaction fostered criti92
cal evaluation of individual judgments.
As an alternative to the pooling hypothesis, some researchers assert that the apparent superiority of group decisionmaking is
merely a function of the ability of one or more members to solve the
problem in question. Put another way, interpersonal interactions
have no synergistic effect. Instead, group performance is attribut93
able solely to the abilities of the best decisionmaker in the group.
As suggested by the experiments recounted in the preceding
section, the evidence on this score is mixed. Miner's results from
the winter survival exercise, for example, give some support to the
best member rather than the synergy hypothesis. 94 In contrast, recall that the Hiltz group found that groups tend to outperform even
their best members in the winter survival exercise.
As between Miner and the Hiltz group, deciding whose results deserve greater credence is difficult. Miner used business students, while the Hiltz group used unspecified undergraduates.
Miner also used a larger number of groups than did the Hiltz group.
Moreover, while the Hiltz group used a single experimental sequence in which individual pretests preceded group discussion, the
order varied in Miner's survey. 95 In addition, Miner's finding is corroborated by the Hall group's, whose results from a different experimental design also tend to support the best member hypothesis.96 On the other hand, the Hiltz group's results are supported by
a number of other studies also using different experimental designs. Their findings, for example, are consistent with those of
Blinder and Morgan. 97
Prior literature reviews have failed to resolve the best member versus synergy debate. 98 Not surprisingly, testing therefore con-

92. Id. at 153.
93. See, e.g., Lorge & Solomon, supra note 89, at 140; Norman R.F. Maier & James A. Thurber, Innovative Problem-Solving by Outsiders: A Study of Individuals and Groups, 22
PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 237, 248 (1969) (concluding that a group's product depends on having "one
good problem-solver present").
94. See Miner, supra note 47, at 116-17, 120-22 (noting qualifications, including problems
identifying the group's best member).
95. Blinder and Morgan reported slightly significant evidence that the ordering of the
rounds mattered. BLINDER & MORGAN, supra note 48, at 20-21. Most studies, however, have
found that the order of individual versus group actions does not affect the results. Miner, supra
note 47, at 115.
96. See supra note 74.
97. See BLINDER & MORGAN, supra note 48, at 44-46 (concluding that the best performer
explanation for group superiority was not supported by their data).
98. Compare Haft, supra note 7, at 9-10 (summarizing studies finding that groups generally
outperform even their best individuals, with James H. Davis, Some CompellingIntuitions About
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tinues. For example, Yetton and Bottger used the NASA moon problem, which is similar to the arctic survival scenario, to examine the
best member hypothesis.9 9 Their subject pool mixed mid-level corporate managers and graduate management students. As usual, individuals ranked the survival items and then repeated the task in
interacting groups. In one version of the study, individual group
members were asked to identify the group's supposed best member.
In a second, the group as a whole selected its supposed best member. 100 A number of findings are of interest. First, interacting
groups outperformed nominal groups, which tends to disprove the
statistical pooling hypothesis, and nominal groups outperformed
their average member, which tends to demonstrate group superiority.'10 Second, on average, the true best members of the groups outperformed the groups, although the difference was not statistically
significant. 02 This finding thus weakly supports the best member
hypothesis. Third, in the version in which individuals acting alone
identified the supposed best member of the group, the average score
of the supposed best members was below that of interacting groups,
which is inconsistent with the best member hypothesis. 0 3 Fourth,
in the version in which the group collectively identified its supposed
best member, the groups' average score was higher than that of the
supposed best members, but the difference was not statistically significant. The authors hypothesize that the process of identifying the
group's supposed best member generates a commitment to implementing the chosen person's solution,10 4 which would be consistent
with both the best member hypothesis and a social preference for
group decisionmaking.
Michaelsen, Watson, and Black ("the Michaelsen group") designed an interesting experiment the results of which suggest that
group decisionmaking has synergistic effects. Their sample con-

Group Consensus Decisions, Theoretical and EmpiricalResearch, and InterpersonalAggregation
Phenomena: Selected Examples, 1950-1990, 52 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 3, 6-8 (1992) (supporting the best member hypothesis). One comprehensive literature
review concludes that "group performance was generally qualitatively and quantitatively superior to the performance of the average individual[,]" but that "the performance of one exceptional
individual can be superior to that of a committee." Hill, supra note 68, at 535.
99. Philip W. Yetton & Preston C. Bottger, Individual Versus Group Problem Solving: An
Empirical Test of a Best-Member Strategy, 29 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE
307, 311 (1982).
100. See id. (describing experiment).
101. See id. at 312-13 (discussing results).
102. Id. at 313.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 318.
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sisted of 222 team-learning groups from organizational behavior
courses. The subjects devoted the vast majority of class time to
problem-solving tasks, some conducted by groups and others individually. Students were randomly assigned to a single group for the
entire course, spent at least thirty-two hours working together, and
solved a variety of problems. The data collected were scores from
objective tests taken throughout the semester. The tests were taken
first as individuals and then as a group. Both individual and group
scores counted towards the grade. 10 5 The mean group score was
89.9, which exceeded both the mean average individual (74.2) and
best individual (82.6) scores. 10 6 Strikingly, all 222 groups outperformed their average member and 215 of the 222 groups outperformed their best member. Both findings were statistically significant. 0 7 The Michaelsen group's results thus tend to disprove both
the pooling and best member hypotheses, while lending support to
the claim that group decisionmaking has synergistic effects.
Note that several features of the Michaelsen group's experimental design replicate certain aspects of board decisionmaking. As
with boards, for example, their groups interacted episodically over
an extended period. In addition, the task resembled the board's information processing function. Group members were required to
elicit information from one another, to evaluate critically that information, and to achieve consensus. Boards must engage in such
processes with respect to both their strategic planning and monitoring functions. 0 8 On the other hand, despite the researchers' efforts
to devise tests that required a high degree of cognitive effort, the
task at issue here differs from those of boards both in its simplicity
and the existence of a single correct answer. Finally, the study also
replicates organizational settings by linking both individual and
group performance to a significant reward (i.e., higher grades), although the partial separability of the task diverges from the board
setting.
My own view is that the best member hypothesis debate does
not tell us very much about optimal corporate governance. As noted
above, the ability to identify the "best" individual decisionmaker is
solely an artifact of the experimental design. In the corporate setting, there are no individual pretests that allow one to identify the

105. See Michaelsen et al., supra note 58, at 835 (describing experiment).
106. Id. at 836.
107. Id.
108. Cf. Baysinger & Hoskisson, supra note 24, at 74 ("Operationally, directors must draw
inferences about the merits of top management on the basis of the financial performance of the
firm or their direct observations of the decision-making process.").
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best decisionmaker in a sample. Many organizational tasks involve
team production, moreover, in which task non-separability and the
infeasibility of effort monitoring preclude identification of superior
decisionmakers.
It is particularly unlikely that a group itself can ex ante accurately identify the best decisionmaker among its members. Bias,
information asymmetries, and various collective action problems
can all skew selection of the superior individual decisionmaker.
Members of subject groups, for example, tend to believe they are
superior to other group members. 10 9 Yet, "all the children in Lake
Wobegon cannot really be above average."" 0 This so-called overconfidence bias thus likely skews selection of superior decisionmakers. Other constraints on a group's ability to identify correctly its
best decisionmaker include status differentials, social norms, and
bounded rationality-based flaws in the evaluative process."'
Put another way, an advantage of group decisionmaking is
that the group is sure to get the benefit of its best decisionmaker. A
group that delegates decisions to the individual identified by the
group as its best decisionmaker may not do so. Miner's study tested
this hypothesis by requiring the subject groups to identify which of
their members was the best decisionmaker. With four member
groups, of course, random selection would be correct twenty-five
percent of the time. Although Miner's groups were slightly more
accurate in selecting their best members than random chance, the
difference was not statistically significant." 2 If experimental groups
cannot accurately identify the best decisionmaker in their midst, as
Miner concludes, this finding casts doubt on the ability of shareholders to select an ideal single decisionmaker. Further doubt on
that hypothesis is cast by Miner's additional finding that the average quality of group decisions exceeded the average quality of the
decisions made by the individuals selected by each group as their
best decisionmaker." 3 In contrast, while the Vollrath group is more
optimistic about groups' ability to identify their best members, their
findings also support a preference for group decisionmaking." 4 On

109. See Neil Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 809-19 (1980) (summarizing studies).
110. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 17, at 1091.
111. Hillel J. Einhorn et al., Quality of Group Judgment, 84 PSYCHOL. BULL. 158, 159 (1977).
112. Miner, supra note 47, at 120.
113. Id. at 118.
114. See supra text accompanying note 104.
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balance, accordingly, it seems likely that shareholders are better off
with a committee than with an individual.
2. Individual Versus Group Decisionmaking Biases
Research in behavioral economics has identified a number of
pervasive cognitive errors that bias decisionmaking. 115 According to
the proponents of behavioral economics, these biases result in behavior that systematically departs from that predicted by the tradi16
tional rational choice model.'
It is the systematic nature of these biases that is critical.
Standard economic analysis recognizes that individual decisionmakers may depart from rationality, but assumes that such departures come out in the wash-they cancel each other out so that the
average or equilibrium behavior of large groups will be consistent
with rational choice. By asserting that decisionmakers exhibit systematic biases, behavioral economics denies that claim. 117 This literature draws extensively from experimental economics and cognitive psychology, which makes it a close cousin of the work on group
versus individual decisionmaking.
Several of the identified decisionmaking biases seem especially pertinent to managerial decisionmaking. Two examples, however, should suffice-namely, herding behavior and the overconfidence bias. In both cases, group decisionmaking may counteract
individual biases.
a. Herding
As I have demonstrated elsewhere, the popularity of participatory management among corporate managers owes much to herd

115. Useful literature reviews include Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476-79 (1998); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 17, at 106768; Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal
Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1511-18 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein,
BehavioralLaw and Economics: A ProgressReport, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 115, 121-46 (1999).
116. The extent to which behavioral economics calls into question more traditional modes of
economic analysis remains sharply contested. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure:
A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1028, 1059-60 (2000) (arguing that behavioral
economics must be used with care). At the very least, however, it seems clear that attention must
be paid to the possibility that a behavioral economics analysis might shed light on legal problems. Id.
117. Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 862 (1992).
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behavior. 118 Chevalier and Ellison found that young mutual fund
managers tend to herd into popular market sectors and conventionally weighted portfolios. 119 Kahan and Klausner contend that herding by lawyers explains the persistence of suboptimal provisions in
bond indentures. 120 Accordingly, the possibility that corporate managers herd seems quite plausible.
Herd behavior occurs when a decisionmaker imitates the actions of others while ignoring his own information and judgment
with regard to the merits of the underlying decision. 12 1 Various explanations for herd behavior have been offered, such as the prospect
that following the crowd may have a reputational pay-off even if the
chosen course of action fails. Because even a good agent can make
decisions leading to an adverse outcome, those who evaluate the
actor look at both the outcome and the action before forming a
judgment about the agent. If a bad outcome occurs, but the action
was consistent with approved conventional wisdom, the hit to the
manager's reputation from an adverse outcome is reduced. 122 As
Keynes famously remarked, "It is better . . .to fail conventionally
than to succeed unconventionally."' 123 If group decisionmaking provides superior mechanisms for monitoring both the group itself
and/or its subordinates, as the next section argues, the incentive to
herd is reduced. An agent can depart from conventional wisdom
with more confidence that an adverse outcome will be fairly evaluated.
Herding also can be a response to bounded rationality and
information asymmetries. Under conditions of complexity and uncertainty, actors who perceive themselves as having limited information and who can observe the actions of presumptively betterinformed persons may attempt to free ride by following the latter's
decisions. Importantly, this explanation for herding suggests that

118. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately OrderedParticipatoryManagement: An OrganizationalFailuresAnalysis, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 1002-04 (1998). Participatory management is a
generic term for any system of industrial relations "purporting to involve employees in workplace
decision making," e.g., quality circles and self-directed work teams. Id. at 981.
119. Judith Chevalier & Glenn Ellison, Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers, 114 Q. J.
ECON. 389, 409-16 (1999).
120. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, PathDependence in Corporate Contracting:Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior, and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 348, 353-56 (1996)
(positing herding as one of several reasons for that persistence).
121. See generally Peter H. Huang, Herd Behavior in Designer Genes, 34 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 639, 645-53 (1999) (providing a detailed review of theories of herd behavior).
122. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 120, at 356.
123. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT,
MONEY 158 (1936).
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the introduction of new information may alter the equation. Hence,
herding motivated by an information asymmetry produces short124 If
lived fads in which consumer preferences prove quite brittle.
group decisionmaking is an efficient adaptation to bounded rationality, as the preceding section argued, the incentive to herd is again
diminished.
b. Overconfidence
The old joke about the camel being a horse designed by a
committee captures the valid empirical observation that individuals
are often superior to groups when it comes to matters requiring
creativity.125 Research on brainstorming as a decisionmaking process, for example, confirms that individuals working alone generate
a greater number of ideas than do groups. 126 Strikingly, this is especially true when the assigned task is "fanciful" rather than "realistic." 127
Although individuals may well be better at devising a brilliant plan, individuals often become wedded to their plans and fail
to see flaws that others might identify. 128 As with all decisionmakers, corporate managers likewise become heavily invested in their
beliefs, which makes them unable to recognize that those beliefs

124. David Hirshleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads, and Informational Cascades, in THE NEW ECONOMICS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 188, 191-93 (Mariano Tammasi &
Kathryn Ierulli eds., 1995).
125. Cf. CLARK, supra note 7, at 110 (asserting that "individuals are often superior at tasks
requiring the creation and construction of a coherent, highly integrated plan or project ").
126. Hill, supra note 68, at 527.
127. Id. Three factors might explain why groups are relatively worse at performing tasks requiring creativity or brilliance. First, some brilliant members of a group may proffer brilliant
proposals that other members of the group simply fail to appreciate. Because groups decide questions only in ways that achieve a consensus, brilliant ideas which only one or two members of a
group appreciate or understand are not likely to be the object of a group consensus. Second, some
members of a group may oppose the brilliant proposals of others out of envy. Assuming the brilliant individuals would be singled out for praise or favorable recognition for coming up with the
brilliant ideas, some individuals may oppose the ideas simply to prevent the more brilliant individuals from achieving reputational gains over them. Finally, some members of a group may
adulterate brilliant proposals with suboptimal amendments simply to exert their authority as a
member of the group. Many times, members of a decisionmaking body insist on making a proactive contribution to every matter that comes before the body for resolution. Such members may
feel that if they do not personally alter or make a substantive contribution to every solution that
their bodies adopt, other members may ignore or disregard their authority. Such members constantly seek to reassert their power by rejecting a proposal unless the body accepts the member's
own ideas or amendments even if the original proposal is essentially perfect and needs no
amendments.
128. PETER M. BLAU & W. RICHARD SCOTT, FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS 117-21 (1962).
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may be biased. 129 The relevance of overconfidence bias to the problem at hand is confirmed by our analysis of the best member hy3 0

pothesis. 1

In contrast, there is a widely shared view that groups are
superior at evaluative tasks. 13 1 As we have seen, this intuition is
largely confirmed by the winter survival exercise studies, such as
those conducted by Miner or the Hiltz group.132 Group decisionmaking presumably checks individual overconfidence by providing critical assessment and alternative viewpoints, a hypothesis supported
33
by Shaw's analysis of her experimental findings.1
The assumption that group decisionmaking constrains overconfident individuals is consistent with the standard account of the
board's function. Recall that our taxonomy identified three basic
board roles: monitoring, service, and resource gathering. At the core
of the board's service role is providing advice and counsel to the
senior management team, especially the CEO.1 34 At the intersection

of the board's service and monitoring roles is the provision of alternative points of view. Put another way, most of what boards do requires the exercise of critical evaluative judgment, but not creativity. Even the board's policymaking role entails judgment more than
creativity, as the board is usually selecting between a range of options presented by subordinates. The board serves to constrain subordinates who have become wedded to their plans and ideas, rather
than developing such plans in the first instance.
As an admittedly anecdotal example, consider the saga of
RJR Nabisco's efforts to develop a smokeless cigarette. 135 As the

story goes, management spent millions of dollars on the project.
When the board was finally informed, many directors were reportedly angered by management's failure to consult with them beforehand. Their anger was wholly justified, for the smokeless cigarette
flopped. Those responsible resigned to avoid being fired. The corporation would have been better served if the board had been advised
of the project early in its development. Those responsible seem to

129. Langevoort, supra note 3, at 807.
130. See supra notes 109-13.
131. See CLARK, supra note 7, at 110 (asserting that "small groups are distinctly superior to
individuals at revealing the errors and problems associated with proposals put forward by individuals").
132. See supra notes 70-76, 94-97 (summarizing studies).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 87-88.
134. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
135. The following discussion is based on BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT
THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR NABIScO 74-77 (1990).
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have been wedded to the project, a tendency the board might have
been able to counteract.
c. Group Biases
The proposition that group decisionmaking counteracts individual biases obviously overlaps with the claim that group decisionmaking is an adaptive response to bounded rationality. Numerous studies suggest that groups benefit from both pooling information and from providing opportunities for one member to correct
another's errors. 136 If so, the benefits of group decisionmaking
should be present whether those errors arise from limitations on
cognitive powers or biases in the exercise of those powers.
Separating out cognitive biases is useful, however, because it
requires us to grapple with evidence that cohesive groups are subject to their own unique cognitive biases. 137 A widely cited example
is the so-called risky shift phenomenon. Although we might assume
that group decisionmaking has a moderating influence, social dilemma experiments demonstrate that groups actually make more
extreme decisions than individuals. In early versions of these experiments, individual subjects were pretested by being presented
with a story in which they were featured as the central characters.
The story placed them in a familiar social setting and asked them
to choose between two options, one of which was described as being
the riskier of the two, but also as having a potentially higher return. Small groups were then presented with the same problem and
asked to make a collective decision. Groups were significantly more
likely to select the riskier option than individuals. 138 Given that individuals tend to be risk averse but that shareholder interests often
require risk-preferring decisions, the risky shift phenomenon seems
useful on first blush. Unfortunately, later experiments demonstrated that group shifts to greater caution could also be induced. 139
There seems to be a polarizing effect in group decisionmaking, so
that post discussion consensus is more extreme than the individual
140
pretest results.

136. See Hill, supra note 68, at 533 (summarizing studies).
137. In addition, as discussed infra notes 165-70, collective action problems and social loafing
limit the effectiveness of groups as a check on individual bias.
138. Davis, supra note 98, at 10.
139. Id.
140. For discussion of the polarization effect, see Norbert L. Kerr, GroupDecision Making at
a Multialternative Task: Extremity, Interfaction Distance, Pluralities,and Issue Importance, 52
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 64, 88 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 85 (2000).
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The most significant group bias for our purposes, however, is
the "groupthink" phenomenon. Highly cohesive groups with strong
civility and cooperation norms value consensus more than they do a
realistic appraisal of alternatives. 1 41 In such groups, groupthink is
an adaptive response to the stresses generated by challenges to
group solidarity. To avoid those stresses, groups may strive for
unanimity even at the expense of quality decisionmaking.
To the extent groupthink promotes the development of social
norms, it facilitates the board's monitoring function.142 It may also
support other board functions, such as resource acquisition, to the
extent that it promotes a sort of esprit de corps. The downside,
though, is erosion in the quality of decisionmaking. The desire to
maintain group cohesion trumps the exercise of critical judgment.
Adverse consequences of groupthink thus include failing to examine
alternatives, failing to be either self-critical or evaluative of others,
and being selective in gathering information. Studies of meeting
behavior, for example, conclude that people tend to prefer options
14 3
that have obvious popularity.
Boardroom culture encourages groupthink. Boards emphasize politeness and courtesy at the expense of oversight. 144 CEOs
foster and channel groupthink through the exercise of their powers
to control information flows, reward consensus, and discourage reelection of troublemakers. The groupthink phenomenon therefore
demands close attention with respect to a variety of corporate gov-

ernance issues. 145
3. Agency Costs
In a sense, the preceding discussion is a special case of the
broader agency cost phenomenon. Individuals shirk, sometimes as a
rational response to incentives and sometimes because of biased
decisionmaking. In either case, group decisionmaking may help
constrain those tendencies.

141. IRVING L. JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK 2-9 (1972) (discussing groupthink).

142. See infra notes 162-64 (discussing group norms).
143. Sara Kiesler & Lee Sproull, Group DecisionMaking and Communication Technology, 52
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 96, 96, 110-12 (1992).
144. MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMS, AND
ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS 49-50 (2000).

145. A corporate governance issue to which groupthink is especially relevant is the debate
over board composition, but that debate is largely beyond the scope of this Article. See infra text
accompanying note 156.
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Insofar as monitoring is concerned, group decisionmaking
has a bidirectional makeup. In the vertical dimension, is a group
superior to an individual autocrat as a monitor of subordinates in
the corporate hierarchy? In the horizontal dimension, do intragroup
governance structures help constrain shirking and self-dealing at
the apex of the hierarchy?
a. Vertical Monitoring
Suppose the corporate hierarchy was capped by an individual autocrat rather than a board of directors. Under such circumstances, a bilateral vertical monitoring problem arises. On the one
hand, the autocrat must monitor his or her subordinates. On the
other hand, someone must monitor the autocrat.
As we have seen, hierarchy is an adaptive governance response to the agency cost problem. Yet that explanation raises the
question of "who watches the watchers?" Because all members of
the hierarchy are themselves agents of the firm with incentives to
shirk, a mechanism to monitor their productivity and reduce their
incentive to shirk must also be created, or one ends up with a
never-ending series of monitors monitoring lower-level monitors.
Alchian and Demsetz solved this dilemma by requiring that the
monitor be given the residual income left after all other workers
have been paid. 146 This arrangement encourages the monitor to
promote the most efficient use of the other inputs and to reduce
shirking because his reward will depend upon the efficacy of his
monitoring efforts. Unfortunately, their model breaks down with
respect to the public corporation.147 Although common stockholders
are the corporation's residual claimants, they also are the corporate
constituency perhaps least able to monitor management behavior.
Corporate law therefore provides a series of alternative accountability mechanisms designed to constrain agency costs without the need for an unending series of monitors. Chief among them
is the board of directors. Putting a group at the apex of the corporate hierarchy turns out to be a highly effective alternative solution
to the problem of an otherwise unending chain of monitors.

146. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production,Information Costs, and Economic Organization,62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 782 (1972).
147. Alchian and Demsetz tried to solve this problem by arguing that "the policing of managerial shirking [in the corporate context] relies on across-market competition from new groups of
would-be managers as well as competition from members within the firm who seek to displace
existing management." Id. at 788. In a world of passive shareholders and takeover defenses,
however, this is a solution that does not solve.
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In theory, our hypothetical autocrat could be monitored by
his or her subordinates. Fama contends, for example, that lowerlevel managers monitor more senior managers. 148 Such upstream
monitoring, however, does not take full advantage of specialization.
Fama and Jensen elsewhere point out that one response to agency
costs is to separate "decision management"-initiating and implementing decisions-from "decision control"-ratifying and monitoring decisions.' 49 Such separation is a defining characteristic of the
central office typical of M-form corporations. The M-form corporation replaces the simple pyramidal hierarchy with a more complex
structure in which the central office has certain tasks and the operating units have others, which allows for more effective monitoring
through specialization, sharper definition of purpose, and savings
in informational costs. 150 In particular, the central office's key decisionmakers-the board of directors and top management - specialize in decision control. Because low- and mid-level managers specialize in decision management, expecting them to monitor more
senior managers thus calls on the former to perform a task for
which they are poorly suited.
A different critique of Fama's hypothesis is suggested by evidence with respect to meeting behavior from research on group decisionmaking. In mixed status groups, higher status persons talk
more than lower-status members. Managers, for example, talk more
than subordinates in business meetings.' 5 ' Such disparities result
in higher-status group members being more inclined to propound
initiatives and having greater influence over the group's ultimate

decision. 152
One function of the board of directors thus is providing a set
of status equals for top managers.153 As such, corporate law's insistence on the superiority of the board to management begins to make
sense. To the extent law shapes social norms, admittedly a contested proposition, 154 corporate law may empower the board to con-

148. See Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON.
288, 293 (1980).
149. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 301, 315 (1983).
150. WILLIAMSON, supra note 17, at 320.
151. Kiesler & Sproull, supra note 143, at 109.
152. Id. at 110 (describing studies in which MBA students were matched with college freshmen).

153. Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the
Large Corporation,80 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1061 (1982) (describing the board as "a peer group-a
collegial body of equals, with the chief executive as the prima inter pares").
154. See Bainbridge, supra note 116, at 1052-53 (describing debate).
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strain top management more effectively by creating a de jure status
relationship favoring the board. Interestingly, note that the status
effect of board membership may be especially important with respect to insider-dominated boards. Because subordinate managers
have ample opportunity to monitor the CEO's effectiveness but are
constrained by status relationships from acting on their knowledge,
board membership might empower them to act. 155
Whether a board comprised solely or even mainly of insiders
would be effective is a matter of considerable debate. 156 A tenet held
by many players in that debate, however, is that a board comprised
of independent directors is an essential constraint on top management. To be sure, outsiders have neither the time nor the information necessary to be involved in the minutiae of day-to-day firm
management. What outsiders can do, however, is to monitor top
managers and replace those whose performance is subpar. In theory, the very presence of independent directors to whom decisions
must be presented for approval and who must be persuaded to give
their approval should go a long way toward encouraging managers
5 7
to make better and more faithful decisions.
b. Horizontal Monitoring
A hierarchy of individuals whose governance structures contemplate only vertical monitoring cannot resolve the problem of
who watches the watchers. Instead, it seems the vicious circle can
be broken by placing a group at the apex of the hierarchy. Where an

155. If the CEO is the only insider on the board, the CEO will have significant information

advantages vis-h-vis other board members. Inclusion of additional insiders may tend to offset
that information asymmetry by providing outsiders with access to alternative, status-empowered
sources of information. See Johnson et al., supra note 26, at 417.
156. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARv. L. REV. 597, 616, 632 (1982) (suggesting that independent directors have faced
obstacles in policing managerial conflicts of interest and assuring maximization of shareholder
wealth); Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDozo L. REV. 265, 268 (1997) (questioning
whether reform proposals that mandate board independence and retraction of the board's management function are desirable for all firms); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing
the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 865 (1991)
(proposing increased harmonization of outside directors and shareholders in lieu of an increase
in the independence of outside directors from management); Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directorsand Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation,98
COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 1314 (1998) (concluding that independent boards appear to have earned
higher "economic profits" in the 1990s than boards with passive, nonindependent boards); James
Tobin, The Squeeze on Directors:Inside Is Out, 49 BUS. LAW. 1707, 1708 (1994) (examining the
proactive role for outside directors as a means for improving corporate performance).
157. Note that this theory is consistent with the hypothesis that outsiders bring alternative
viewpoints to the table, thereby counteracting individual decisionmaking biases.
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individual autocrat would have substantial freedom to shirk or selfdeal, the internal dynamics of group governance may constrain selfdealing and shirking by individual team members and, perhaps,
even by the group as a whole. Within a production team, for example, mutual monitoring and peer pressure provide a coercive backstop for a set of interpersonal relationships founded on trust and
other noncontractual social norms. 158 Of particular relevance here

are effort and cooperation norms. 15 9
Behavior is regulated by both law and social norms. A standard example of the distinction between the two is that leaving a
tip after one eats in a restaurant is a social norm, while paying for
one's food is a legal requirement. Accordingly, we can roughly define a social norm as a social attitude specifying the behavior an
actor ought to exhibit in a given situation. 160 Although economists
only recently began exploring the role norms play in regulating behavior, an astonishingly rich literature has developed in just a few
years.
While the old adage opines "familiarity breeds contempt,"
personal proximity to others in fact deeply affects behavior. As people become closer, their behavior tends to improve. "[S]omething in
us makes it all but impossible to justify our acts as mere selfinterest whenever those acts are seen by others as violating a moral
principle"; rather, "[w]e want our actions to be seen by others-and
by ourselves-as arising out of appropriate motives."' 161 Small
groups strengthen this instinct in several ways.

158. In addition, diffusion of responsibility in corporate decisionmaking among a group constrains agency costs because it requires a conspiracy to make opportunism effective. Group conspiracies commonly are more difficult to effectuate than misconduct by a single individual.
159. Social norms are relevant to other aspects of decisionmaking besides agency costs.
Group norms of reciprocity, for example, facilitate the process of achieving consensus within

groups. Kerr, supra note 140, at 90-91. For example, a study of flight deck crew effectiveness has
found that cooperation norms encourage crew members to trust and heed one another. Forbes &
Milliken, supra note 6, at 496 (citing results of Karl E. Weick & Karlene H. Roberts, Collective
Mind in Organizations:Heedful Interratlingon Flight Decks, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 357 (1993)).
Studies of group norms in shop floor work teams have made some interesting findings that
may be relevant to the board setting. First, group norms tend to evolve toward group rules.
Cohen & Bailey, supra note 25, at 251. Group effort norms are positively correlated with team
member self-evaluations but not with management ratings of teams. Id. Norms are also positively related to a variety of attitudinal measures, such as organizational commitment. Id. at
257.
160. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 17, at 1127.
161. James Q. Wilson, What Is Moral and How Do We Know It?, COMMENTARY, June 1993, at
37, 39; see also Bettenhausen, supra note 25, at 348 (discussing the role of group membership in
the shaping of member behavior and attitudes).
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First, they provide a network of reputational and other social
sanctions that shape incentives. Because membership in close-knit
groups satisfies the human need for belonging, the threat of expulsion gives the group a strong sanction by which to enforce compliance with group norms. Because close-knit groups involve a continuing relationship, the threat of punishment in future interactions deters the sort of cheating possible in one-time transactions:
Informal peer group pressures can be mobilized to check malingering.... The
most casual involves cajoling or ribbing. If this fails, rational appeals to persuade
the deviant to conform are employed. The group then resorts to penalties by withdrawing the socia4 benefits that affiliation affords. Finally, overt coercion and ostracism are resorted to.162

Second, because people care about how they are perceived by
those close to them, communal life provides a cloud of witnesses
whose good opinion we value. We hesitate to disappoint those people and thus strive to comport ourselves in accordance with communal norms. Effort norms will thus tend to discourage board
members from simply going through the motions, but instead will
163
encourage them to devote greater cognitive effort to their tasks.
Finally, transaction costs economics provides an explanation
for the importance of closeness in trust relationships. The members
of close-knit groups know a lot about one another, which reduces
monitoring costs and thus further encourages compliance with
group norms. These members therefore tend to internalize group
norms.
Taken together, these factors suggest that group decisionmaking is a potentially powerful constraint on agency costs. It creates a set of high-powered incentives to comply with both effort and
cooperation norms. This analysis thus goes a long way towards explaining the otherwise puzzlingly formalistic rules of state corporate law governing board decisionmaking. It also explains many
widely observed traits of real world boards:
Invitations to the board are based heavily on matters like compatibility and "fit."
The work of the board prizes consensus, not conflict. Absent some sort of crisis,
outside members see their value largely in terms of constructive advice, giving insiders the benefit of an expert external perspective on the company's uncertain
world. '6 4

These are precisely the traits our analysis suggests one
ought to observe. Mutual compatibility promotes the sort of inter-

162. WILLIAMSON, supra note 85, at 48.
163. See Forbes & Milliken, supra note 6, at 493-94.
164. Langevoort, supranote 3, at 797.
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personal relationships that allow board members to develop norms
of trust and cooperation. The same holds true with respect to the
emphasis on consensus. Finally, the outsider's role of providing an
"expert external perspective" is one reason group decisionmaking
will be superior to that of a given individual.
c. Caveats
As noted, any hierarchy must resolve the problem of "who
shall watch the watchers." Alchian and Demsetz's elegant solution
of assigning the residual claim to the shareholders fails with respect to the public corporation due to the various constraints on
shareholder activism. The board of directors can be understood as
an adaptive response to that problem, providing a self-monitoring
hierarch whose internal governance structures provide incentives
for optimal monitoring of its subordinates.
In general, it will be harder for the top decisionmaker to selfdeal or shirk when part of a group. Mutual monitoring and social
norms, enforced through peer pressure and reputational sanctions,
provide important constraints on behavior. In addition, a multimember board is inherently harder for misbehaving subordinates to
suborn than would be a single autocrat. Instead of having to bribe
or otherwise co-opt a single individual, the wrongdoers now must
effect a conspiracy among a number of monitors. 165 Consequently,
the board potentially can provide a significant institutional constraint on agency costs.
Research on group decisionmaking, however, confirms the
widely shared intuition that there are limits to the board's ability to
monitor both its own members and the senior management team.
First, monitoring actors' compliance with social norms becomes
harder as the relevant community becomes larger and less closely
knit. Social sanctions are also far more effective as applied within a
close-knit group than among strangers. 166 Conversely, however,

165. If one individual serves as the final authority on corporate decisions, the corporation's
managers need only coerce or entice that single individual into complying with their selfinterested requests to give them effect and, hence, harm the corporation as a whole. If a group of
individuals has the final authority on questions of corporate governance, however, managers
must coerce or entice multiple individuals to acquire the de facto power to pursue their self-

interest. Because managers are less likely to capture a group than an individual, managers are
less likely to self-deal with a corporation that is ultimately governed by a group rather than an
individual.
166. Cf. Donald McCloskey, Bourgeois Virtue, AM. SCHOLAR, Spring 1994, at 177, 183-84
(contending that the importance of trust to market exchange explains why members of the same
ethnic group frequently can deal profitably with one another). Although kinship doubtless is a
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close-knit groups are also those most vulnerable to groupthink.
Consequently, it is noteworthy that the risky shift literature is consistent with a social norm-based account. Participation in group
decisionmaking processes likely induces conformity with established or emergent group norms.
Second, as we have seen, group decisionmaking can result in
social loafing. 167 The extent to which social loafing is a problem will
vary from group to group. In Shaw's study, for example, despite the
relatively small size of the groups (four members), several of the
studied groups contained one or more members who contributed
little if anything to discussion or problem solving. In other groups,
168
however, all subjects participated cooperatively.
A study by Szymanski and Harkins sheds especially interesting light on the social loafing phenomenon. They focused on task
nonseparability as a causal'explanation for social loafing. It was
known, prior to their study, that social loafing diminished when the
experimenter could meter the effort of individual members of a
group. Szymanski and Harkins tested whether social loafing also
could be reduced by self-metering against a defined standard. Sixty
undergraduates taking an introductory psychology class were asked
to list as many uses as possible for a knife. Half of the subjects were
told that the experimenters would count how many uses each subject generated. The other half were told that the experimenter
would not be able to measure individual performance, although it in
fact was possible to do so. Pretests confirmed that the subjects believed these conditions were satisfied by the experiment. The manipulation of experimenter evaluation was crossed with a manipulation of self-evaluation. Half the subjects were told that, at the end

powerful explanation for norm compliance, we also observe norm compliance in other social
groups, including some commercial settings. Diamond exchanges, commodity trading associations, and the historical law merchant all exhibit norm compliance. Critically, however, each of
these settings is characterized by a dense social network embedded in an intimate society that
provides a framework for repeat transactions. For example, Bernstein's classic study of the diamond market acknowledged that "geographical concentration, ethnic homogeneity, and repeat
dealing may be necessary preconditions to the emergence of a contractual regime based on reputation bonds." Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal ContractualRelations

in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 140 (1992). On the other hand, group research
suggests that even ad hoc groups develop norms quite quickly. Hill, supra note 68, at 530. In any
event, such conditions may not be necessary to the maintenance of such a regime once it has
established itself. Instead, as the diamond industry departed from those conditions, it shifted to
a regime based on information technology and intermediaries. Bernstein, supra, at 143-44.
167. That social loafing is a problem for boards of directors is confirmed, albeit anecdotally,
by an internal self-assessment of Campbell Soup's board. See Forbes & Milliken, supranote 6, at
489. The report concluded, inter alia, that some board members did not adequately participate in
meetings and that the board as a whole failed to devote adequate time to strategic planning. Id.
168. Shaw, supra note 46, at 500-01.
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of the experiment, they would be told the average number of uses
generated in the experiment. The other half were told that, for confidentiality, they would not be provided with that information.169
Where the subjects believed the experimenter could evaluate
their results, there was no difference between those who had an
opportunity for self-evaluation and those who did not. Where the
subjects believed that the experimenters could not evaluate their
results, those who believed self-evaluation was not possible generated fewer uses than those who believed they would be given a
standard for self-evaluation. Strikingly, self-evaluation alone generated as many uses as experimenter evaluation. 170 Comparable
results were obtained in a slightly more complex experiment using
pairs. Szymanski and Harkins's study strongly suggests that hierarchical monitoring is not the only means of preventing shirking.
Instead, monitoring by other members of a team (such as peer pressure) and self-monitoring against a standard are equally effective.
Effort norms provide just such a social standard against which
board members measure themselves and their fellows. In other
words, a board with strong social norms should be less subject to
social loafing than groups that are less close-knit.
Finally, collective action problems may impede the ability of
decisionmaking groups to constrain agency costs. This concern
seems especially plausible with respect to the board of directors.
Because effective performance of the board's oversight duties requires collective action, we have a potential free riding problem.
Even though faithful monitoring may be in an individual director's
interest, he or she may assume that other directors will do the hard
work of identifying subpar performances, permitting the free rider
to shirk. As in any free riding situation, this will tend to result in
suboptimal levels of monitoring.
Even in cases of clearly subpar management performance,
moreover, other collective action problems may prevent the board
from taking necessary remedial steps. Some director must step forward to begin building a majority in favor of replacing the incumbent managers, which again raises a free rider problem. Furthermore, if an active director steps forward, he or she must not only
overcome the forces of inertia and bias, but also must likely do so in
the face of active opposition from the threatened managers who will

169. See Szymanski & Harkins, supra note 41, at 893-94 (describing method).
170. Id. at 894.
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try to cut off the flow of information to the board, co-opt key board
members, and otherwise undermine the disciplinary process.
None of these caveats suggest that corporations ought to be
run by an individual autocrat rather than a board of directors. On
balance, effort and cooperation norms within a small, close-knit
group, such as the board, provide high-level incentives. Concerns
about groupthink, social loafing, and collective action failures, however, all prove relevant to operationalizing group decisionmaking in
the corporate setting.
C. Correlations
The analysis herein models the board of directors as a production team whose product consists of a unique combination of advice giving, ongoing supervision, and crisis management. To the
extent the board makes discrete decisions, those decisions typically
entail some form of monitoring. The board reviews and approves
major business decisions, sets executive compensation, hires and
fires senior management, and the like. Rarely does the board engage in day-to-day managerial decisionmaking. Instead, that role is
reserved to the CEO and the other members of the top management
team.
The efficiency of this allocation of corporate power is confirmed by the literature on group decisionmaking. Creative planning is a task best left to individuals; hence, it is not surprising
that the board does little in that area. In contrast, groups excel at
tasks requiring the exercise of critical evaluative judgment, team
learning, institutional memory, and the like. This is precisely the
skill set desirable in an effective monitor. As a supervisory agent,
the board develops an institutional memory that allows it to measure performance over time, while its critical evaluative judgment
allows it to assess that performance.
To be sure, the performance of many boards with respect to
these tasks is suboptimal, if it occurs at all. As we have seen, however, market forces have encouraged boards to become more independent, deliberative, and critical than were their predecessors.
The remaining question is whether the relevant legal regimes are
well-designed to encourage optimal group decisionmaking on the
part of the board.
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REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS

A. The Statutory Formalitiesof Corporate Governance
1. Board Size
Corporate statutes historically required that boards consist
of at least three members who had to be shareholders of the corporation and, under some statutes, residents of the state of incorporation.171 Today these requirements have largely disappeared. Section
141(b) of the Delaware Code authorizes boards to have one or more
members and mandates no qualifications for board membership.
MBCA Sections 8.02 and 8.03 are comparable. As a default rule,
allowing single-member boards probably makes some sense. It gives
promoters maximum flexibility, while allowing the creation of multimember boards at low cost. In light of the apparent advantages of
group decisionmaking, however, it is hardly surprising that multimember boards are the norm for corporations of any significant
size. To be sure, board sizes vary widely. A 1999 survey found that
slightly less than half had seven to nine members, with the remaining boards scattered evenly on either side of that range.172
Is there an optimal board size? It is mildly puzzling that the
literature on group decisionmaking has not paid more attention to
questions of group size. Studies in which group size is an experimental variable are rare; worse yet, many studies of other variables
fail even to hold group size constant. 173 The principal exceptions are
studies of optimal jury size. Unfortunately, those studies are inconclusive at best.174
As for studies of board size in particular, one meta-analysis
found a statistically significant correlation between increased board
size and improved financial performance. 175 Given the potential influence of moderating variables, however, it does not seem safe to

171. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.03(a) cmt. 1 (1998).
172. National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD), Public Company Governance Survey 1999-2000 at 7 (Oct. 2000) (forty-four percent between seven and nine).
173. Davis, supra note 98, at 16.
174. Id. at 17-21 (summarizing studies).
175. Dan R. Dalton, Number of Directors and Financial Performance: A Meta-Analysis, 42
ACAD. MGMT. J. 674, 676 (1999).
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draw firm conclusions from that survey. Other studies, moreover,
176
are to the contrary.
Here, then, is an opportunity for further research. In theory,
a number of factors favor large boards. Larger size may facilitate
the board's resource-gathering function. More directors will usually
translate into more interlocking relationships with other organizations that may be useful in providing resources such as customers,
clients, credit, and supplies. Board interlocks may be especially
helpful with respect to formation of strategic alliances. Firms considering a joint venture need access to credible information about
the competencies and reliability of prospective partners. Almost by
definition, however, this information is asymmetrically held and
subject to strategic behavior. Interlocks between prospective partners provide both access to such information and, by analogy to
77
hostage taking, a credible bond of the information's accuracy.
Larger boards with diverse interlocks are also likely to include a greater number of specialists-such as investment bankers
or attorneys. This is relevant not only to the board's resourcegathering function, but also to its monitoring and service functions.
Complex business decisions require knowledge in such areas as accounting, finance, management, and law. Providing access to such
knowledge can be seen as part of the board's resource-gathering
function. Board members may either possess such knowledge themselves or have access to credible external sources who do. This hypothesis is consistent with the new institutional economics view of
specialists. In that model, specialization is a rational response to
bounded rationality. The expert in a field makes the most of his or
her limited capacity to absorb and master information by limiting
the amount of information that must be processed through limiting
the breadth of the field in which the expert specializes. As applied
to the corporate context, larger, more diverse boards likely contain
more specialists, and therefore should get the benefit of specialization. In addition, with reference to the debate over the best member

176. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board
Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BuS. LAW. 921, 941-42 (1999) (summarizing studies);
Theodore Eisenberg et al., Larger Board Size and DecreasingFirm Value in Small Firms, 48 J.
FIN. ECON. 35, 36 (1998) (finding a significant negative correlation between board size and firm
profitability in small and medium Finnish firms).
177. See Ranjay Gulati & James D. Westphal, Cooperative or Controlling? The Effects of
CEO-Board Relations and the Content of Interlocks on the Formation of Joint Ventures, 44
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 473, 475 (1999).
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hypothesis, specialization is a way for the group to identify the superior decisionmaker with respect to specific issues. 7 8
On the other hand, a number of considerations suggest that
small boards may be preferable. Large boards will tend to be contentious and fragmented, which would reduce their ability collectively to monitor and discipline senior management. In such cases,
the senior managers can affirmatively take advantage of the board
through "coalition building, selective channeling of information,
and 'dividing and conquering.' "179
The social loafing phenomenon also suggests an upper limit
on efficient group size. As group size grows, for example, the number of nonparticipants (loafers) likely increases. Conversely, larger
boards may inhibit the formation of the sorts of close-knit relationships by which groups constrain agency costs.

178. Note that, because their decisions are publicly observable, board members have a strong
incentive to defer to expert opinion. Because even a good decisionmaker is subject to the proverbial "act of God," the market for reputation evaluates decisionmakers by looking at both the
outcome and the action before forming a judgment. If a bad outcome occurs, but the action was
consistent with approved expert opinion, the hit to the decisionmaker's reputation is reduced. In
effect, by deferring to specialists, a decisionmaker operating under conditions of bounded rationality is buying insurance against a bad outcome.
In a collegial, multi-actor setting, the potential for logrolling further encourages deference. A
specialist in a given field is far more likely to have strong feelings about the outcome of a particular case than a nonexpert. By deferring to the specialist, the nonexpert may win the specialist's
vote in other cases as to which the nonexpert has a stronger stake. Such logrolling need not be
explicit, although it doubtless is at least sometimes, but rather can be a form of the tit-for-tat
cooperative game. In board decisionmaking, deference thus invokes a norm of reciprocation that
allows the nonexpert to count on the specialist's vote on other matters. This prediction is supported by findings with respect to group polarization, in which the majority coalition makes
small concessions so as to trigger the norm of reciprocity. See Kerr, supra note 140, at 92 (noting
the use of such norms).
The normative payoff of this insight is at least two-fold. First, insofar as board decisionmaking itself is concerned, directors should consciously ask whether deference to specialists is appropriate in a particular instance. Second, it validates state statutes relating to board reliance on
expert opinion. Under section 141(e) of the Delaware Code, directors are "fully protected in relying in good faith" on reports or opinions of external experts. The statute requires that the director reasonably believe the matters in question are within the expert's professional competence
and that the expert has been chosen with reasonable care. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141(e)
(2000). Case law suggests that this standard requires at least some inquiry into the basis of the
expert's opinion. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874-75 (Del. 1985) (interpreting
section 141(e)).
179. Jeffrey A. Alexander et al., Leadership Instability in Hospitals: The Influence of BoardCEO Relations and OrganizationalGrowth and Decline, 38 ADMIN. ScI. Q. 74, 79 (1993). On the
other hand, some commentators contend that large boards provide more opportunities to create
insurgent coalitions that constrain agency costs with respect to senior management. William
Ocasio, Political Dynamics and the Circulation of Power: CEO Succession in U.S. Industrial
Corporations,1960-1990, 39 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 285, 291 (1994).
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2. The Arcana of Meeting Procedures

The board of directors is a collegial body that, for the most
part, makes decisions by consensus. Accordingly, an individual director acting alone generally has neither rights nor powers.1 80 Instead, unless otherwise authorized by statute, only collective decisions taken at a meeting of the board at which a quorum is present
are binding on the corporation. 181 This common law principle is reflected, albeit by negative implication, in section 141(b) of the
Delaware Code, which states that "[t]he vote of the majority of the
directors present at a meeting at which a quorum is present shall
be the act of the board of directors .... "182 The MBCA's drafters contend that the same requirement is implied by their statute's
provisions on board meetings. 183 All of this doubtless seems formalistic and silly at first blush, but because interacting groups produce
better decisions, the requirement that the board act only after
meeting as a collective body actually has a sound basis.
Consider also the statutory requirement that directors may
participate in board meetings by conference call or speakerphone
only if all participants can hear one another. 8 4 The requirement
that members be able to "hear" one another seems quaint in an era
of electronic mail, instant messaging, and Internet chat capabilities. Yet, when Delaware recently amended its corporation statute
to permit much greater use of electronic forms of communication, it
retained the requirement that board meetings be conducted in such
a way that all members be able to hear one another. As it turns out,
this appears to have been the right choice. Research on decisionmaking has found that groups linked by computer make fewer remarks and take longer to reach decisions than do groups meeting
face to face. 185 Kiesler and Sproull, for example, not only found that
meetings conducted through computers result in greater delays, but

180. This general statement is subject to the caveat that individual directors do have rights
to inspect corporate books and records. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cocoline Prods. Inc., 127 N.E.2d 906,
907-08 (N.Y. 1955).
181. See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141(f) (authorizing boards to act without a meeting by
means of written consents, but requiring unanimity); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.21 (1998)
(same).
182. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141(b) (emphasis added).
183. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.20 cmt (1998) ("A well-established principle of corporate common law accepted by implication in the Model Act is that directors may act only at a
meeting unless otherwise expressly authorized by statute.").
184. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141(i); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACTANN. § 8.20(b) (1998).
185. Hiltz et al., supra note 75, at 243-44; Jane Siegel et al., Group Processes in ComputerMediated Communication, 37 ORGAMIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 157, 174
(1986).
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also that the decisions made in such meetings were more likely to
exhibit the risky shift phenomenon.'8 6 They also found that timeconstrained groups exchanged much less information when meeting
187
electronically than when meeting face-to-face.
As with other aspects of the rules governing board meetings,
accordingly, there seems to be a legitimate basis for otherwise formalistic rules. Electronic communication takes place mostly
through text-based mediums. For many people reading and typing
are slower and require greater effort than verbal communication.
Text-based communication also deprives participants of social cues,
such as body language and tone of voice, which may be important
signals. Social norms constraining behavior apparently function
less well in text-based communication, as illustrated by the flame
wars that plague Usenet newsgroups. Even such housekeeping
rules as notice requirements prove to be consistent with the research on group decisionmaking. Unless the articles of incorporation require otherwise, no notice of regularly scheduled board meetings is required. 188 Special meetings require at least two-days notice. 8 9 As a matter of statutory law, the requisite notice need not
announce the purpose of the meeting. 190 Because the directors' duty
of care requires them to make an informed decision, however, it is
advisable whenever possible to provide directors with advance notice of the reason for calling a meeting and any relevant documentation.1 9 1 As with other requirements relating to board meetings,
the notice rules are intended to ensure that the board functions as a

186. Kiesler & Sproull, supra note 143, at 108, 113.
187. Id. at 108.
188. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.22(a) (1998).
189. Id. § 8.22(b).
190. Id.
191. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985). In Van Gorkum, the court
held that the board breached its fiduciary duty of care by "approving the 'sale' of the Company
upon two hours' consideration, without prior notice, and without the exigency of a crisis or emergency." Id. The court went on to note: "None of the directors, other than Van Gorkom and Chelberg [two insiders], had any prior knowledge that the purpose of the meeting was to propose a
cash-out merger of Trans Union ....
Without any documents before them concerning the proposed transaction, the members of the Board were required to rely entirely upon Van Gorkom's
20-minute oral presentation of the proposal." Id.; see also Gimbel v. Signal Co., Inc., 316 A.2d
599, 612-15 (Del. Ch.), aff'd per curiam, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974). In Gimbel, the court criticized
the fact that (1) the board meeting was called on only one-and-a-half days' notice and (2) that the
company's outside directors were not notified of the meeting's purpose, which were cited as factors in the court's determination that the company's management had failed to give the board
"the opportunity to make a reasonable and reasoned decision." 316 A.2d at 615.
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collegial body, all of whose members participate and get the benefit
192
of the participation by all other members.
That notice requirements effectively carry out that function
is suggested by research on group performance. The Michaelsen
group conducted a study in which individuals were pretested and
then retested as members of a group. Under those conditions,
groups outperformed individuals. The Michaelsen group analogize
this testing order to organizational decisionmaking processes in
which "group members prepare a position paper and circulate it to
other group members prior to problem-solving discussions."' 93 A
board meeting conducted after meaningful notice likewise replicates
this testing order.
Finally, the research on group decisionmaking is relevant to
the long-standing debate over cumulative voting in the election of
directors. On the one hand, cumulative voting may bring a desirable diversity of viewpoints into the boardroom. On the other hand,
board cohesiveness likely suffers. 194 Whether cumulative voting is
desirable for a given firm will therefore vary. Firms whose top
management team requires advice from diverse sources might benefit from cumulative voting, although the high probability of adversarial relations between that team and minority shareholder interests suggests that board representation of the latter likely would
prove unavailing in this regard. Firms requiring skeptical outsider
viewpoints to prevent groupthink likewise might benefit from cumulative voting. Again, however, the likelihood that cumulative
voting results in affectional conflict rather than cognitive conflict
leaves one doubtful as to whether those benefits will be realized.
3. Payoff
The group decisionmaking literature's prescriptive payoff
should be apparent. On the one hand, lawyers, judges, and legislators all spend much of their working lives in committees and other
group settings. Their informed intuitions about effective group decisionmaking usually will serve them well both with respect to running boards and making corporation laws, as the preceding statutory analysis confirms. On the other hand, the findings of group

192. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.23 cmt. (1998). The statutory quorum and voting rules
likewise reinforce the notion of the board as a collegial body, "forcefully bringing the position of
the dissenting member to the attention of the balance of the board of directors." MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.24 cmt. (1998).

193. Michaelsen et al., supra note 58, at 837 (citation omitted).
194. Haft, supra note 7, at 24.
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decisionmaking research are sometimes inconsistent with the intui5 Periodic vetting of corporate
tions of conventional wisdom. 19
law by
group decisionmaking specialists, therefore, may prove useful in
law reform.
B. DirectorLiability
All corporate directors are subject to a fiduciary duty of care
which requires them to exercise "that amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar circumstances."' 196 By invoking the language of reasonable care, the duty
seemingly is violated when directors act negligently. At the same
time, however, the business judgment rule insulates directors from
liability for negligence. The rule does so by providing a presumption
that the directors or officers of a corporation acted on an informed
basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interests of the company. 197 How can those two
principles be reconciled?
The business judgment rule's traditional justification is that
courts are not business experts. 198 Plainly, however, this explanation is inadequate. Business decisions are not the only context in
which judges are called upon to review complex issues arising under conditions of uncertainty. Yet no "medical judgment" or "design
judgment" rule precludes judicial review of malpractice or product
liability cases. Something else must be going on.
Viewing the board of directors as a production team suggests
a partial answer to this conundrum. 199 As we have seen, teams may
well make better decisions than individuals acting alone. But as we
have also seen, however, teams are hard to monitor. The monitoring
problem is especially severe when assessing individual productivity
requires something more than mere effort measurement. Measuring
individual productivity of board members might require, for example, assessing whether the director cooperates with other team
members in responding to changed circumstances or emergencies.

195. See Davis, supra note 98, at 3 (identifying four widely held intuitions that are inconsistent with groups research).
196. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963); see also MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.30 (1998).

197. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
198. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
199. For a more complete answer, see Michael P. Dooley & Stephen M. Bainbridge, The
Business Judgment Rule Within a Theory of the Firm (unpublished manuscript, on file with
authors).
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At best, the board can be monitored only in terms of its joint
output. Yet unlike a manufacturing team, where one can measure
the quantity and quality of goods produced, the joint output of the
board can be assessed only in terms of the quality of its decisionmaking. Not only is that assessment inherently subjective, it is also
likely to be tainted by hindsight bias. As such, judicial review of
board decisionmaking seems unlikely to be a very effective monitoring device.
Worse yet, external review can undermine the internal team
governance structures that regulate team behavior. Relational
teams are not only hard to monitor, they are also hard to discipline.
Dismissal, for example, becomes a sanction of last resort. Team
members develop a sort of synergy as they develop idiosyncratic
ways of working with each other. No member of the team can be
replaced without having a highly disruptive effect on the entire
team. Because such teams can become insular, moreover, even external sanctions falling short of dismissal may have ripple effects
throughout the team. We know, for instance, that insular workplace
teams often fail to deal effectively with outsiders and even expend
resources on power struggles with other teams. Relational teams
thus respond to external monitoring efforts by "circling the wagons"
around the intended subject of sanctions. Put another way, external
review may promote groupthink and thus make it even more likely
that team members will give one another the benefit of the doubt
and/or protect one another. As a result, monitoring of such teams is
most efficiently effected through mutual motivation, peer pressure,
20 0
and internal monitoring.
Alternatively, external litigation review might disrupt interpersonal relationships within the team. Members of a production
team interact over an extended period of time and develop relationships with one another that are important in determining their
conduct. This process leads to a group dynamic that functions as
one of the team's important internal governance structures. With
respect to the relationship between management and the board, for
example, well-functioning group dynamics of this sort will discourage insiders from presenting a proposal to the board that the latter
will perceive as self-dealing by the former. In turn, when the board
deliberates on management's proposal, the same sorts of internal
group dynamics should preclude the board from approving a deal
tainted by self-dealing. The "every man for himself' phenomenon

200. WILLIAMSON, supra note 17, at 245.
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that so often arises in litigation is but one way in which judicial
review might well destroy the interpersonal relationships that fos20 1
ter internal team governance.
Reasonable people can differ as to which of the foregoing effects is likely to predominate in the board setting, but both suggest
external review is potentially problematic. As our discussion of
agency costs suggested, teams have within them a network of social
sanctions that shapes incentives. Judicial review is not an appropriate vehicle for fostering the sort of social norms on which internal team governance relies. Judges are a poor substitute, at best,
for the norm-inculcating power of close-knit groups. But while
courts cannot make citizens virtuous, they can destroy the intermediary institutions that do inculcate virtue: "Communities can be
destroyed from without, but they cannot be created from without;
202
they must be built from within."
Finally, external review may skew director decisionmaking
in undesirable ways. Shareholder litigation encourages directors to
be risk averse. In turn, risk-averse directors take excessive precautions and avoid risky decisions. If the risk of shareholder litigation
causes some members of the team to exercise more care than is optimal, the team must now monitor not only the quality of the decision-making inputs coming from each member, but also the risk
that any given member is unusually risk averse and thus especially
subject to having his or her inputs into the team processes skewed
by the fear of liability.
In sum, internal team governance structures provide a
strong set of constraints on misconduct by the board. In contrast,
external review can undermine the internal team governance structures that regulate team behavior. 20 3 Accordingly, courts should be

201. To the extent that external review undermines mutual trust within a board, it adversely
affects not only the board's monitoring role but also its service functions. See Forbes & Milliken,
supra note 6, at 496. Trust arises out of two primary sources. Id. "Affinity trust" exists ex ante.
Id. It is based mostly on shared values and is most likely to exist where there is ethnic and/or
religious affinity. Id. "Learned trust" arises out of repeat transactions in which the players prove
consistently trustworthy. Id. In a small but heterogeneous community, such as most boards,
learned trust dominates. Id. Trust counteracts the fear of embarrassment that induces reticence
Id. In an environment of trust, board members are willing to present ideas that seem "halfbaked," which promotes earlier and more extensive discussion of alternatives. Id.
202. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 324 (1995).

203. A related but slightly different concern is the multiplicative effect that external review
of team decisionmaking may have on the firm as a whole. Because "the efficiency of organization
is affected by the degree to which individuals assent to orders, denying the authority of an organization communication is a threat to the interests of all individuals who derive a net advantage from their connection with the organization ...." CHESTER I. BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF
THE EXECUTIVE 169 (2d ed. 1962). Put another way, by calling into question the legitimacy of the
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reluctant to interfere with board decisionmaking, which is precisely
what the business judgment rule commands. 2 4 Properly understood, the business judgment rule really is an abstention doctrine.
Courts will abstain from reviewing the substantive merits of the
directors' conduct unless the plaintiff can rebut the business judgment rule's presumption of good faith.
Note that this approach explains a number of aspects of the
business judgment rule left unexplained by alternative theories.
The fact that the business judgment rule does not insulate director
fraud or self-dealing, for example, makes good sense. The decisions
to which duty of care litigation is addressed are typically collective
actions by the board as a whole. Management teams are constrained to exercise reasonable care in decisionmaking by a combination of external market forces and internal team governance
structures. When an individual director decides to pursue a course
of self-dealing, however, he or she has already committed to betraying internal team relationships. Courts appropriately are less concerned about destroying internal team relationships when the defendant director's misconduct has already destroyed them. Conversely, by providing a set of external sanctions against selfdealing, the law encourages directors to refrain from such betrayals.
The implications of litigation for group dynamics also help
explain the oft-maligned decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom.2 °5 In
1980, Trans Union's Chairman, Van Gorkom, negotiated a merger
contract with an entity controlled by financier Pritzker. Trans Union's board and shareholders approved the deal. Plaintiffshareholder Smith sued, alleging that the board's approval of the
merger violated the Trans Union directors' duty of care. The defendant directors contended that their decision to sell the company
should be protected by the business judgment rule.
The court began its analysis by noting that the business
judgment rule provides a presumption that in making a decision
the directors acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the

central decisionmaking body's authority, external review may reduce the incentive for subordinates to assent to that body's decisions and thereby undermine the efficient functioning of the
entire firm.
204. Cf. WILLIAMSON, supra note 85, at 49 (stating that whether "additional or alternative
controls would be consistent with the peer group structure is seriously to be questioned").
205. 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985) (describing the board's decision to approve the sale of the
company "upon two hours' consideration, without prior notice, and without the exigency of a
crisis or emergency").
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honest belief that the decision was in the firm's best interests. 20 6
The protection provided by the business judgment rule is unavailable, however, if the directors failed to inform themselves of all material information reasonably available to them. 2 7 In the course of
its opinion, the court focused closely (albeit not exclusively) on issues of board process. The board made no effort to determine how
much control would be worth to Pritzker, such as ordering a valuation study, for example, and in the absence of such a determination
20 8
had no basis for deciding whether the price was a fair one.

Under the circumstances, the directors had a duty of inquiry.
Considering the haste and other circumstances surrounding the
decision, they should have pressed Van Gorkom with regard to the
details of the deal. Instead, the board blindly relied on Van
Gorkom's assertion that the price was fair. 20 9 Van Gorkom failed to
disclose, and the board failed to make sufficient inquiry to discover,
key facts suggesting that the deal was not as attractive as it
seemed on first look.
Qualitative studies of board processes have found wide variances. Some boards simply go through the motions of showing up
and voting, without having done their homework. 210 The Delaware
Supreme Court concluded that the Trans Union directors were just
such a board. 21 ' Other boards, however, exhibit far greater diligence. Such boards research issues, participate actively in discussion, and exercise critical judgment. 212 As for sorting out which type
of board predominates, it seems noteworthy that about two-thirds
of surveyed boards now have at least some control over their
3
agenda. 21
While qualitative performance no doubt varies, the formal
structure of the corporate governance system vests most decisionmaking power in the board of directors, especially with regard to
major corporate changes such as a merger. Facts tending to suggest
that senior officers are trying to railroad a decision through the

206. Id. at 872.
207. Id.
208. See id. at 875-78 (discussing board's lack of information regarding valuation).
209. See id. at 874-75 (criticizing board's passive reliance on Van Gorkom).
210. Forbes & Milliken, supra note 6, at 494.
211. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874 (holding that the board was "grossly negligent in approving the 'sale' of the Company upon two hours' consideration, without prior notice, and without the exigency of a crisis or emergency").
212. Forbes & Milliken, supranote 6, at 494.
213. NACD, supra note 172, at 12 (fifty-eight percent in 1997 and sixty-nine percent in
1999).
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board therefore are inconsistent with that model. Unfortunately for
Trans Union's directors, the Van Gorkom record was rife with such
21 4
facts.
To be sure, as we have seen, corporate law generally does not
mandate detailed rules of board process or procedure. How the
board sets its agenda, whether formal voting rules are observed,
and other matters of parliamentary procedure are left to the board's
discretion. Yet, there are lots of theoretical reasons to think that
the procedural rules for aggregating individual preferences have
outcome determinative effects, such as Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Laboratory experiments on group decisionmaking, such as
studies of mock juries, confirm that procedural matters such as the
taking of straw votes and the setting of agendas do affect outcomes. 215 It is doubtful, however, whether ex ante legislative solutions would be viable given the complexities and uncertainties of
life. In contrast, however, ex post judicial review of board process
may be beneficial.
Consistent with that hypothesis, Van Gorkom rests not on a
failure to comply with some judicially imposed decisionmaking
model, but on the absence of a sufficient record of any deliberative
process. Put differently, if the decisionmaking process is adequate,
the court will continue to defer to the decision that emerges from
that process. The basic thrust of the opinion is that the board must
provide some credible, contemporary evidence that it knew what it
was doing. If such evidence exists, the court will not impose liabilone.
ity-even if the decision proves to have been the wrong
By so focusing its opinion, the Van Gorkom court arguably
created a set of incentives consistent with the teaching of the literature on group decisionmaking. The decision disfavors agenda control by senior management, penalizes boards that simply go

214. See, e.g., Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 892 (summarizing defects in management's role).
215. Mock juries reviewing the same evidence, for example, regularly reach differing verdicts. See Davis, supra note 98, at 23-33 (summarizing studies); see also Robert C. Erffmeyer &
Irving M. Lane, Quality and Acceptance of an Evaluative Task: The Effects of Four Group Decision-Making Formats, 9 GROUP & ORGANIZATIONAL STUD. 509, 523 (1984) (finding that decisionmaking formats have predictable effects on quality of decision); Volkema & Gorman, supra
note 73, at 116 (finding that, in carrying out the winter survival exercise, groups that formulated
problems and opportunities outperformed those who did not).
One possible explanation for such divergences is the effect of agenda control. A well-known
study, for example, concluded that setting a specific agenda affected an airplane club's decision
as to which plane to buy. Michael E. Levine & Charles R. Plott, Agenda Influence and Its Implications, 63 VA. L. REV. 561, 571-81 (1977); Charles R. Plott & Michael E. Levine, A Model of
Agenda Influence on Committee Decisions, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 146, 146 (1978). Agenda research
confirms that both the way the decision is cast and the sequence in which issues are taken up
affect the outcomes of such decisions. Davis, supra note 98, at 25.
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through the motions, and encourages inquiry, deliberation, care,
and process. The decision strongly encourages boards to seek outside counsel and financial advice, which is consistent with evidence
that groupthink can be prevented by outside expert advice and
evaluations. 2 6 Even the court's criticism of the board's willingness
to take action after a single meeting is consistent with suggestions
that a "second-chance meeting" also helps prevent groupthink. As
such, the oft-repeated law and economics critique of Van Gorkom
appears overblown. Contrary to what most law and economics
scholars have asserted, there is a rational basis for the seemingly
formalistic procedures mandated by that opinion.
V. CONCLUSION
In the tradition of New Institutional Economics, this Article
assumes that the firm must be viewed as an institution-more precisely, as a set of institutions-rather than as a mere production
function. Specifically, the firm consists of a set of production teams
embedded within a hierarchical structure. At the apex of that hierarchy stands not an individual, but yet another team-the board of
directors. Why?
Team production is imperfect, whether the product is a
manufactured good or a corporate decision. Teams are subject to
unique cognitive biases, such as groupthink, and unique sources of
agency costs, such as social loafing. With respect to the exercise of
critical evaluative judgment, however, groups have clear advantages over autonomous individuals. Not only do groups clearly outperform average individuals in a given sample, there is considerable (albeit contested) evidence that the process of group interaction has synergistic effects allowing groups to outperform even the
best decisionmakers in the sample. One of the contributions made
by this Article is the development of institutional explanations for
group superiority. Because most board tasks entail the exercise of
critical evaluative judgment, moreover, the analysis herein confirms that corporations are well-served by group decisionmaking at
the top.
Consequently, conventional economic analysis of corporate
governance needs to rethink the frequently made assumption that
agents are both rational actors and autonomous individuals. When
lawyer-economists write about monitoring, they seem to have a
mental image of a supervisory worker watching a subordinate

216. See generally IRVING JANIS, GROUPTHINK (1982) (discussing solutions for groupthink).
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working at a separable task (think of a foreman watching a classic
production line). Instead, agents are boundedly rational actors who
commonly function within teams. Successful teams are characterized by the emergence of new forms of internal governance structures that constrain agency costs, but do so without anything that
even remotely resembles traditional hierarchical monitoring. Team
spirit and peer pressure, for example, take on considerable importance in teams. Put more broadly, internal team governance structures act as a substitute both for external monitoring by a hierarch
and for legal sanctions. Indeed, as we have seen, in most cases
these internal governance structures ought to serve as the principal-even sole-constraint on shirking by members of the team.
In keeping with the emergent school of behavioral economics,
this Article is an exercise in intellectual arbitrage. In particular,
the work of cognitive psychologists on group decisionmaking is imported into the economic analysis of governance institutions. The
outcome is a richer and more nuanced account of why boards exist
and how they function. At the same time, of course, the account is
less determinate than traditional models. Elegant and parsimonious models, though, are more important for economists than for
lawyers. 2 17 Situation-specific mini-theories of behavior thus may be
more useful for making legal decisions than a single unified theory
like the traditional rational choice model. 218 This Article demonstrates that the literature on group decisionmaking provides just
such a set of mini-theories.

217. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 17, at 1072.
218. Id. at 1073.
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